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OREGON PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA v.
REGAL CINEMAS, INC.: THE RISE OF STADIUM
SEATING IN MOVIE THEATERS AND THE
DISABLED'S FIGHT FOR A COMPARABLE
SEAT IN THE HOUSE
Off to the movies we shall go, where we learn everything that
we know.'
INTRODUCrION
The screen goes dark and the words "Spider-Man 2" emblazon the
screen. 2 In your field of vision, however, all you see is "ider-Ma."
You scan from left to right to get the full title. Then the movie begins.
You sit up straight, but that hurts your neck. You slouch down in the
seat, and when that fails to improve your view, you continue slouching
until your rear end is halfway off the seat, but to no avail. The fast-
moving images on screen appear to be one giant blur. You begin to
get nauseous. Your head starts hurting. You bemoan the influence of
lightning-quick, MTV-style editing on today's motion pictures. You
glance around and notice that almost everyone else sitting behind you
in the stadium section of the theater seems to be doing just fine. At
that point, the person in the wheelchair sitting next to you leans over
and says, "Not the greatest view, is it?"
Stadium seating in movie theaters has become a big draw for audi-
ences since its inception in 1995.3 The advantages of the stadium-style
theaters are numerous, and it is universally recognized that stadium
seating "provides a markedly superior view and experience to tradi-
tional seating in traditional theaters."' 4 Yet, in a majority of these the-
1. SOUTH PARK: BIGGER, LONGER & UNCUT (Paramount Pictures 1999).
2. SPIDER-MAN 2 (Columbia Pictures 2004). This film met with almost unanimous critical
praise and shattered the five-day box office record, grossing over $152 million. See Box Office
Mojo, at www.boxofficemojo.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
3. The first movie theater to introduce the stadium seating concept was AMC's Grand Thea-
ter 24 of Dallas, Texas in 1995. United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092,
1095 (C.D. Cal. 2002). AMC Entertainment, Inc. is a nationwide theater chain based in Kansas
City, Missouri. Id.
4. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (D. Mass. 2003), vacated by
380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004).
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aters,5 disabled moviegoers lack the option to sit in stadium seats, and
are relegated to the traditional section of the theater. Since 1998, sta-
dium-style movie theaters have faced increasing amounts of litigation
over their compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). 6 Specifically, the litigation concerns Title III of the ADA and
section 4.33.3 of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) issued
by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
(Access Board) and adopted by the Department of Justice (DOJ).7
Title III of the ADA applies to sports and entertainment facilities.8
Section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG has been subject to various interpre-
tations and analyses by courts and government regulatory agencies in
the past few years. 9 The portion of section 4.33.3 at issue is the phrase
"lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general pub-
lic."' 10 Both the DOJ and disabled patrons throughout the United
States have argued that "lines of sight comparable" applies to both
physical obstructions and viewing angles."1 The federal circuit courts
and other state district courts disagree on whether to defer to such an
interpretation. Some courts have held that section 4.33.3 only re-
quires that wheelchair users have unobstructed views and not that
they sit at comparable viewing angles to the screen. 12 On the other
5. For example, the court in United States v. Hoyts found only two instances where movie
theaters had placed wheelchair-accessible seats in both the stadium section and traditional sec-
tion. Id. at 80.
6. David Watson, Ninth Circuit Rules: Movie Theaters May Not Relegate Wheelchair Patrons to
Front, METRO. NEWS ENTER., Aug. 14, 2003, at 1 (quoting Kathleen Wilde of the Oregon Advo-
cacy Center in Portland). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000).
7. See cases cited infra note 9.
8. Mita Chatterjee, Note, Access Denied and Not Designed: The Ninth Circuit Drafts a Narrow
Escape for Architect Liability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act in Lonberg v. Sanborn
Theatres, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 293, 294 (2002).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that
section 4.33.3 applies to lines of sight and physical obstructions, but the term "integral" does not
require wheelchair seats in a particular part of the theater); Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp.,
69 Fed. Appx. 19 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding the case to the district court to determine whether
the DOJ's interpretation is entitled to deference in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision); United
States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003) (imposing a viewing angle require-
ment and remanding to the district court to determine the extent of that requirement); Or. Para-
lyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 is entitled to deference); Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207
F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 is not entitled to
deference and the regulation only requires lines of sight that are free of physical obstructions);
United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the
DOJ's interpretation is entitled to deference).
10. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
11. See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. See Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that section 4.33.3
only applies to physical obstructions and not to viewing angles).
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hand, a number of other courts have agreed with the DOJ and have
deferred to its interpretation of section 4.33.3.13 One of the most no-
table court decisions to shed light on this issue is Oregon Paralyzed
Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas. 14
In Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the dispute surrounding
wheelchair patrons' viewing angles in stadium-style movie theaters
and the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3.15 The Ninth Circuit
held that stadium seating does not provide "full and equal enjoyment"
of movie theater services by disabled patrons under Title III of the
ADA. 16 Consequently, movie theaters in the Ninth Circuit are placed
in the precarious position of being in violation of the ADA with no
clear indication of how they can successfully alter or retrofit their the-
aters to comply with the guidelines offered by the court. 17 This ruling
is in direct conflict with that of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Lara v. Cinemark, which held that stadium-style
theaters comply with the ADA and provide "full and equal enjoy-
ment" by providing unobstructed views.18
This Note addresses the conflict in federal courts over the interpre-
tation of language in section 4.33.3, specifically the various construc-
tions of the phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for members of
the general public,"' 19 and the consequences that flow from the Ninth
Circuit's retroactive regulation.20 Scholars have commented on this
conflict in the past, but no one has yet explored a specific plan that
movie theaters can put into effect.2' This Note attempts to craft a
feasible plan for movie theaters to follow. The circuit split between
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, coupled with the number of other law-
suits currently in litigation across the country and further still, the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari in the Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of
13. Excluding Lara, see cases cited supra note 9.
14. 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
15. See id. at 1131. "The language at issue is [section] 4.33.3's reference to 'lines of sight
comparable to those for members of the general public."' Id. (quoting Or. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (D. Or. 2001)).
16. Id. at 1133.
17. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
18. Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000). See infra Part II.
19. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A., § 4.33.3 (2003).
20. See infra notes 422-513 and accompanying text.
21. See generally Chatterjee, supra note 8; Ellsworth, infra note 319; McKibbin, infra note 109;
Milani, infra note 32; and Joshua D. Watts, Note/Comment, Let's All Go to the Movies, and Put
an End to Disability Discrimination: Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas,
Inc. Requires Comparable Viewing Angles for Wheelchair Seating, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
1 (2004).
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America case, 22 indicate that the issue of wheelchair patrons' viewing
angles in stadium-style movie theaters demands attention. Part II of
this Note discusses the background of the case, including the history
of stadium seating in movie theaters, 23 the legislative history of Title
III of the ADA,24 the Access Board and DOJ's role in administering
guidelines, 25 and a summary of other cases that have addressed the
issue.26 Part III discusses the facts, procedural history, holding, rea-
soning, and dissenting opinion of Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. Regal Cinemas.27 Part IV presents an analysis of the key
issues raised by the Ninth Circuit in Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of
America.28 Part V reflects upon the impact of the decision and offers
possible solutions to the various issues in question.29 Finally, Part VI
of this Note concludes that the Ninth Circuit's decision should only be
applied prospectively. Part VI further argues that the DOJ should
refrain from further litigation against stadium-style movie theaters
and seek the Access Board's assistance to revise section 4.33.3 or
adopt a new regulation. 30
II. BACKGROUND
This section begins with a discussion of the history of stadium seat-
ing in movie theaters, and the enhanced movie-going experience such
seating provides. This section next addresses the motion picture thea-
ter exhibition industry guidelines and their relevance. It also discusses
the legislative history of Title III of the ADA. Finally, this section
concludes with summaries of other decisions that have addressed the
issue-those that have held that section 4.33.3's language covers phys-
ical obstructions only, as well as those that have held it covers both
physical obstructions and viewing angles.
22. 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003). On Monday, June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court refused to
hear Regal's appeal to consider the issue, and sent the case back to the district court with the
Ninth Circuit's decision intact. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, 339 F.3d 1126
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2903 (2004).
23. See infra notes 32-68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text
25. See infra notes 77-113 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 114-194 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 195-269 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 270-421 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 422-513 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 514-522 and accompanying text.
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A. Enhancing the Movie-Going Experience: Stadium Seating in
Movie Theaters
Invented in 1995, stadium seating has come into widespread use in
recent years.31 Stadium seating gets its name from the difference in
elevation from row to row that "creates the effect of a viewing angle
similar to that found when sitting in a tiered sports stadium. ' 32 All
stadium-style theaters are split into two different sections: a stadium
section and a traditional section.33 These two sections are usually sep-
arated by an access aisle. 34 The majority of seats in a stadium-style
movie theater are located in the stadium section.35 In many, if not
most of these theaters, wheelchair locations are clustered in the tradi-
tional section.36 Patrons access the stadium seating by climbing up
stairs.37 These seating platforms raise each row of seats eighteen in-
ches above the row directly in front of it.38 The gradual elevation of
each row allows patrons to see around the person in front of them,
thereby giving them a direct view of the screen.
The purpose of stadium seating in movie theaters is to "maximize
unobstructed views" for moviegoers. 39 Its popularity can be largely
attributed to the enhanced movie-going experience it affords. Sta-
dium seating "virtually suspends the moviegoer in front of the wall-to-
wall screen" and totally envelopes the audience in the movie because
of the "enhanced sight and sound presentation. '40 This enhanced
movie-going experience helps ensure that all stadium seats are the
31. See United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
32. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, 78 (D. Mass. 2003), vacated by
380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004). Sports stadiums have had their own legal problems in complying
with the ADA and section 4.33.3. See generally Adam A. Milani, "Oh Say, Can I See-And Who
Do I Sue IfI Can't?": Wheelchair Users, Sightlines over Standing Spectators, and Architect Liabil-
ity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 FLA. L. REV. 523 (2000).
33. Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 78. The traditional section is comprised of the two to
four rows of seats located in the front of a theater on a flat, gradually sloped floor. AMC Entrm't,
232 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. These seats are much closer to the screen than those in the stadium
section. Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 78. In theaters without stadium sections, all seating is
elevated using a sloped floor and is "accessed by walking up or down an adjacent sloped aisle."
AMC Entrm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
34. Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
35. Stadium seats constitute roughly seventy percent or more of a theater's seats. Hoyts Cine-
mas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
36. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 563 (1st Cir. 2004).
37. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
38. Id. Most theaters provide seating like a typical sports stadium-stepped seating where steps
are sloped at about five percent. See generally Jennifer L. Reichert, Suit Brought by Moviegoers
Who Use Wheelchairs Tests Limits of ADA, 36 JURY TRIAL 133 (2000).
39. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1127 (9th Cir. 2003).
40. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (internal quotation marks omitted). These claims
have been made in AMC press releases, advertisements, and other publicity materials. Id.
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best seats in the house. In addition, stadium seats have a host of other
benefits over traditional seating. Stadium seats usually tilt backward
and rock back and forth; they have reclining, wide arm rests, are gen-
erally wider than traditional seats, and have longer seatbacks and
more leg room.41 Also, because of the stadium section's elevation, the
screen can be expanded. This pleases many moviegoers who place
stock in the phrase: "bigger is better," since movie screens are gener-
ally larger in a stadium-style theater.42 Indeed, moviegoers have indi-
cated a clear preference for stadium-style theaters as a result.43
B. Wheelchair and Companion Seating Placement
While stadium theaters have enjoyed increasing levels of popularity
since their introduction, they have also been the subject of much liti-
gation since 1998. 44 The reason for the litigation is simple: wheelchair
patrons cannot access the stadium seating. 45 The majority of wheel-
chair-accessible seats in stadium theaters are located in the traditional
section of the theater. 46 In any given stadium-style theater, wheel-
chair seats can be found either in the front rows of the traditional
section or in the seats along the access-aisle immediately in front of
the stadium section. Bigger theaters with capacities of over three hun-
dred people are the exception. These theaters provide wheelchair
seating in the far rear of the stadium section where the seats are ac-
41. Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Stipp. 2d at 79.
42. Id. at 78.
43. AMC stated in a recent annual report that stadium-style theaters have "become the indus-
try benchmark" and that AMC customers have "overwhelmingly embraced" the concept. AMC
Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See Watson, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting Kathleen Wilde of the Oregon Advocacy Center in
Oregon). From 1996-2000, the Department of Justice (DOJ) made no changes to section 4.33.3.
United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 563 (1st Cir. 2004). Before stadium seating
became popular, the most prominent case involving movie theaters was a suit brought by two
wheelchair-using women against the United Artists EmeryBay theater in Emeryville, California.
The women claimed that they were forced to sit in degrading and inferior areas in the back of
the theater. See Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
The case gave rise to the term "wheelchair ghetto" and United Artists eventually settled the
case, agreeing to provide wheelchair seating in a variety of different locations and to modify
existing seats by installing removable aisle-side armrests. The settlement agreement can be
found at Untitled, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/md2.txt (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). For the
rationale behind the settlement, see Katherine C. Carlson, Comment, Down in Front: Entertain-
ment Facilities and Disabled Access Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 897, 904-11 (1998).
45. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1127.
46. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, 78-80 (D. Mass. 2003), vacated
by 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004). It should be noted that wheelchair-accessible seats are not actual
seats. Rather, they are empty spaces that wheelchairs can fit into. Id.
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cessed by elevator.47 Nevertheless, the general result is that all wheel-
chair patrons "have no choice but to sit in the first few rows of the
theater. '48 Very rarely do stadium theaters place wheelchair-accessi-
ble seats among the stadium section. 49
The viewing angles in a movie theater can be both vertical and hori-
zontal.50 In the traditional section, the vertical viewing angle is signifi-
cantly sharper than in the rest of the theater, ranging between twenty-
four and sixty degrees,51 with a forty-two degree average. 52 In con-
trast, the median vertical viewing angle in the stadium section is
twenty degrees. 53 Physical discomfort occurs for most viewers when
the vertical viewing angle (measured diagonally from the viewer's seat
to the top of the screen) exceeds thirty-five degrees, and when the
horizontal viewing angle (measured perpendicular from the viewer's
seat to the centerline of the screen) exceeds fifteen degrees.54 For
wheelchair patrons, this physical discomfort is often heightened be-
cause they cannot slouch in their seats or recline their bodies.
55
The biggest problem for wheelchair patrons is their lack of choice in
the matter.56 Non-disabled patrons have their pick of any seat in the
47. This is by mandate of section 4.33.3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility
Guidelines (ADAAG), which provide that "when the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair
spaces shall be provided in more than one location." 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
48. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1128.
49. Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
50. For information on optimal viewing distances, which take into account both viewing an-
gles and a selected screen size, see Viewing Distance Calculator, at http://www.myhometheater.
homestead.com/viewingdistancecalculator.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). Entering the main
viewing location along with the screen shape and size will produce certain calculated results,
including the current viewing angle and maximum recommended distances (as recommended by
both the Society of Motion Picture & Television Engineers and Lucasfilm's THX). Id.
51. The National Association of Theater Owners (NATO) said, "[Line of sight is usually con-
sidered in terms of degrees ... the degree of line of sight will vary from seat to seat in a motion
picture theater and also vary from within any given seat to various portions of the screen."
United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
52. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1128.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. It has been argued that the discomfort from limited flexibility in wheelchairs results
from inadequate wheelchair manufacturing. Id. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). NATO ad-
dressed limited flexibility, finding that seats in the rear of a theater gave patrons with limited
flexibility the best viewing angles because viewing angles were smallest. AMC Entm't, 232 F.
Supp. 2d at 1101.
56. However, other problems abound. Kathy Stewmon, a wheelchair user since 1989, said in
her affidavits and deposition testimony,
Sitting in [the front row], so close to the screen, the screen was so huge that I couldn't
focus on it; it made me dizzy trying to focus. I had to keep moving my head and neck
back and forth to look at the whole movie screen. I found myself losing the story
because I was working so hard to watch the screen; I couldn't concentrate on the movie
... I only lasted about 15 minutes in the front row-I couldn't tolerate it. My family
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theater. Wheelchair patrons, on the other hand, are forced to sit in
the first few rows at the front of many theaters. 57 Because of the diffi-
culty and danger in trying to carry a wheelchair up stairs, wheelchair
patrons cannot sit in the stadium section even if there are empty sta-
dium seats. 58 Wheelchair patrons argue that being relegated to the
traditional section amounts to a violation of section 4.33.3 because the
regulation requires "comparable" viewing angles.59 For wheelchair
patrons, unobstructed views of the screen and location among general
public seating alone are not enough to satisfy the requirements of sec-
tion 4.33.3.
C. Industry Guidelines for the Operation of
Motion Picture Theaters
Several organizations within the motion picture industry have is-
sued guidelines for the operation of movie theaters. 60 These guide-
lines do not "necessarily represent current standard operating
conditions and practices. '61 Rather, they act as recommendations on
how to achieve the optimal operation of movie theaters.
The Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers' (SMPTE)
engineering guidelines directly address the customer's viewing experi-
ence and lines of sight. Four elements affect the viewing experience
and lines of sight: "(1) image size; (2) image distortion; (3) visibility;
members dragged my wheelchair up the stairs, which was [a] very dangerous thing to
do, so I could watch the movie.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1128.
57. Id.
58. Even if patrons were to carry a wheelchair up the stairs, there are no blocked out spaces
among the stadium seats for wheelchairs to fit in. See Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 78. The
wheelchair would have to sit in the middle of the stairway, causing a safety hazard. See generally
Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 35 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
59. See supra note 10.
60. This Note singles out the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers (SMPTE)
and Lucasfilm Ltd. (Lucasfilm).
61. LUCASFILM LTD., THX THEATRE ALIGNMENT PROGRAM: RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES
FOR PRESENTATION QUALITY AND THEATRE PERFORMANCE FOR INDOOR THEATRES 2 (2000),
http://www.film-tech.com/manuals/TAPGUIDELINES.pdf.
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and (4) comfort."' 62 According to the SMPTE, the ideal line of sight is
fifteen degrees below the horizontal centerline of the screen.
63
Lucasfilm is Star Wars director George Lucas' film and entertain-
ment company, 64 and its guidelines stress the importance of stadium
seating as an optimum condition and endorse the recommendation
that "the vertical viewing angle from the first row should not exceed
[thirty-five degrees]. ' 65 To keep viewing angles comfortable, "all seats
should be contained within a [forty-five degree] Iso-Deformation
Line."'66 The guidelines also point out that "sight lines, floor pitch,
seat back tilt, and viewer comfort all interact. ' 67 Accordingly, audito-
riums should be constructed to provide unobstructed sightlines and
comfortable viewing angles.
68
D. Legislative History of the ADA and Title III
Congress enacted the ADA on July 26, 1990 based upon findings
that the disabled suffered from discrimination, isolation, segregation,
and lack of physical access to certain facilities. 69 These congressional
62. AMC Entrm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (citing Soc'y of Motion Picture & Television Eng'rs,
No. EG 18-1994, SMPTE Engineering Guideline: Design of Effective Cine Theaters 5 (1994)).
This Engineering Guideline has been withdrawn by action of the Committee on Theatrical Pro-
jection at the SMPTE meeting on March 5, 2003. See SMPTE, Engineering Committees, at http:/
/www.smpte.org/engineering-committees/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). Although withdrawn, the
fact has had no impact on the validity of the cases that cite to it. For example, in November
2003, the Sixth Circuit cited the Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America case as support for its
position and did not even mention the withdrawal of SMPTE Guideline 5. See United States v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2003). In fact, the only effect of Guideline 5's
withdrawal is that courts no longer cite to it in their opinions. See generally id. See also United
States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004).
63. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (citing Soc'y of Motion Picture & Television Eng'rs,
No. EG 18-1994, SMPTE Engineering Guideline: Design of Effective Cine Theaters 5 (1994)).
64. See Company History, Lucasfilm Ltd., at http://www.lucasfilm.com/inside/history/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2005).
65. LUCASFILM LTD., supra note 61, at 16.
66. Id. Iso-Deformation zones-the areas containing iso-deformation lines-exist in movie
theaters, where the lines of sight can be "at such angles as to cause distortion of the visual image
... circles [become] ellipses, squares [become] rhombuses, and all shapes [become] distorted."
AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (discussing Rubens Meister, The Iso-Deformation of
Images and the Criterion for Delimitation of the Usable Areas in Cine-auditoriums, J. Soc'v OF
MOTION PICTURE & TELEVISION ENG'RS 179-182 (Mar. 1966)).
67. Lucasfilm, Ltd., supra note 61, at 10.
68. Id.
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(1)-(3), (5) (2000). The ADA was "[h]ailed as the 'emancipation
proclamation' for the disabled" and "'the most sweeping piece of civil rights legislation possible
in the history of our country."' Chatterjee, supra note 8, at 299 (quoting James P. Colgate, Note,
If You Build It, Can They Sue? Architect's Liability Under Title III of the ADA, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 137, 140 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted). See also 136 Cong. Rec. 17,251, 17,280
(1990); and 136 Cong. Rec. 17,364, 17,376 (1990). In a nationwide poll conducted before the
ADA was passed into law, two-thirds of all disabled Americans were shown to have not at-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
findings revealed that a majority of the disabled population "do not go
to movies, do not go to the theatre, do not go to see musical perform-
ances, and do not go to sporting events. ' 70 Further, Congress con-
cluded that such discrimination "left them severely disadvantaged
socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally," while denying
them "the opportunity to achieve independent living and economic
self-sufficiency. "71
Congress recognized that structures and attitudes could have "dele-
terious effects of discrimination" in people's lives, and it sought to
counteract such effects through Title III of the ADA. 72 Title III pro-
hibits discrimination in places of public accommodation, 73 specifically
stating that: "[n]o person shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place or public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or op-
erates a place of public accommodation. ' 74 It covers movie theaters,
theatrical venues, concert halls, and stadiums, among others,75 and en-
sures that people with disabilities "enjoy the same forms of entertain-
ment as the general population," enabling them to participate in and
interact with mainstream society. 76
E. The Regulatory Authority of the ADAAG
The ADAAG are a set of regulations promulgated by the Access
Board and adopted by the DOJ that govern the required accessibility
standards under Title III of the ADA. This subsection begins by dis-
tended a movie in the past year for fear of nonparticipation and self-consciousness. Case Com-
ment, Civil Rights - Americans with Disabilities Act - Ninth Circuit Holds That Movie Theaters
Must Provide Comparable Viewing Angles for Patrons in Wheelchairs: Oregon Paralyzed Veter-
ans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 117 HARV. L. REV. 727, 733 (2003) [hereinafter Comment].
70. Chatterjee, supra note 8, at 300 (discussing H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 34 (1990)).
71. United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (discuss-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6), (8), (9)). The ADA was thus intended "'to bring persons with disa-
bilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life."' Milani, supra note 32, at
562 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989)).
72. Carlson, supra note 44, at 900.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000). Movie theaters are considered places of public accom-
modations under the ADA. Id. § 12181(7)(c).
74. Id. § 12182(a). Title III also requires that newly constructed public accommodations,
those designed or constructed after January 23, 1993, be "readily accessible to and usable by"
people with disabilities. Id. § 12183(a)(1). Existing facilities that were altered after January 26,
1992 must be readily accessible and usable by people with disabilities "to the maximum extent
feasible." Id. § 12183(a)(2). Public accommodations must give patrons with disabilities "func-
tionally equivalent" experiences to those of other patrons. 28 C.F.R. 88 36.202. .203, .302 (2003).
75. See Carlson, supra note 44, at 900.
76. Id.
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cussing the history of the Access Board's and DOJ's involvement in
Title III regulation. It then lays out the text of section 4.33.3, the pro-
vision-at-issue. This subsection then briefly introduces the DOJ's in-
terpretation of section 4.33.3, and the due deference courts usually
afford it. Finally, this subsection presents the Access Board's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, and the Access Board's recent Amendment
to the ADAAG, adopted in July 2004.
1. Access Board and DOJ Involvement
Congress charged the DOJ, acting through the Attorney General,
with enforcing Title III of the ADA, and it also provided individuals a
private right of action to seek injunctive relief.77 In order to carry out
the provisions of Title III, Congress directed the DOJ to issue regula-
tions that would apply to any of the facilities covered by Title 111.78 In
issuing regulations, the DOJ is required to meet the minimum guide-
lines and requirements issued by the Access Board.
79
The Access Board is a federal agency created by the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.80 The Access Board's mission is to eliminate the "archi-
tectural, transportation, communication, and attitudinal barriers con-
fronting people with disabilities."8' Similar to the DOJ's
responsibilities under the Act,82 Congress charged the Access Board
with responsibilities in connection with Title III, such as "'estab-
lish[ing] and maintain[ing] minimum guidelines and requirements for
the standards issued." 83 These Access Board guidelines serve as a
model for the DOJ in establishing Title III standards. 84
77. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12188(a)-(b) (2000). "In actions instituted by the Attorney General, a
wider range of remedies [beyond injunctive relief] are available." Carlson, supra note 44, at 903.
These other remedies include appropriate equitable relief and monetary damages. Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(A)-(C)). Punitive damages are not allowed. Id. at n.38 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12188(b)(2)(A)-(C)). The DOJ also issues technical assistance manuals and files suit to en-
force compliance with the ADA. See id. §§ 12188(b), 12206 (2000). For instance, the court may
grant any equitable relief it considers appropriate, including monetary damages, and may assess
civil penalties in any amount not exceeding $50,000 for the first violation and $100,000 for subse-
quent violations. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(A)-(C)).
78. Id. § 12186(b). The DOJ also issues technical assistance manuals and files suit to enforce
compliance with the ADA. See id. §§ 12188(b), 12206.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (2000).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 792(a) (2000).
81. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730, 731 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 792(b) (2000)).
82. Differences between the Access Board and the DOJ exist, particularly in relation to the
guidelines each agency issues. The Access Board's guidelines "are the substantive rules they
develop and promulgate." Caruso, 193 F.3d at 734 n.5. DOJ guidelines, on the other hand, are
"interpretation[s] of a substantive rule, not the substantive rule itself." Id.
83. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Arn., 339 F.3d at 1129 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 792(b)(3)(B) (2000)).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 792(b) (2000).
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On July 26, 1991, four years before movie theaters began imple-
menting stadium seating, the Access Board published the ADAAG.8 5
That same day, pursuant to its statutory authority under Title III and
following a notice and comment period,8 6 the DOJ promulgated final
regulations which put into practice Title III of the ADA, and incorpo-
rated the ADAAG without change.87 Section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG
pertains to the placement of wheelchairs in public accommodations.
It is "worded identically" to the Access Board's original text address-
ing the issue of lines of sight. 88
2. The Provision at Issue: Section 4.33.3
Section 4.33.3 provides:
Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan
and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical disabili-
ties a choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to
those for members of the general public .... When the seating ca-
pacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall be provided in more
than one location. Readily removable seats may be installed in
wheelchair spaces when the spaces are not required to accommo-
date wheelchair users.89
This standard contains three separate requirements: sightlines, inte-
gration, and dispersal. This Note focuses mostly on the sightlines re-
quirement. The language of section 4.33.3 "was originally drafted by
the Access Board as part of its proposed accessibility guidelines in
early 1991."90
85. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408 (July 26, 1991).
86. See 56 Fed. Reg. 7452 (Feb. 22, 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 2296 (Jan. 22, 1991).
87. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 562 (1st Cir. 2004); see also 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.406 (2003). While the DOJ adopted the Access Board's guidelines as its own regulations,
"it may still adopt different interpretations of those regulations, so long as they are 'consistent'
with the Board's guidelines." Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engi-
neers, 950 F. Supp. 389, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12186(b), (c) (2000)).
88. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1999). Courts
have held that it can be "plausibly inferred" that the DOJ "deliberately intended the regulation
to mean the same thing as did the Board-but it is not a necessary inference." Milani, supra
note 32, at 543 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have also held
that despite the name difference between the Access Board's regulations and the DOJ's regula-
tions, these standards are used "interchangeably." Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F.
Supp. 698, 708 (D. Or. 1997). See also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public
Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544 (July 26, 1991) (codified at
28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (discussing why the DOJ's and Access Board's regulations are identical).
89. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
90. See Milani, supra note 32, at 530.
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3. DOJ's Interpretation of Section 4.33.3
Because the language of section 4.33.3 is ambiguous, particularly
the phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the
general public," 91 the DOJ has drafted its own interpretation of the
provision.92 According to the DOJ, wheelchair locations in stadium-
style movie theaters "must be provided [with] lines of sight in the sta-
dium seating seats within the range of viewing angles as those offered
to most of the general public in the stadium style seats, adjusted for
seat tilt."'93
The DOJ argues that wheelchair users may not "be relegated to
locations with viewing angles decidedly inferior to those available to
most audience members" and that they must be given "comparable"
viewing angles that are similar or equivalent to those of most of the
general public.94 In addition, the DOJ construes the "integral" re-
quirement of section 4.33.3 to mean that theater owners must provide
wheelchair seating in areas where the general public usually chooses
to sit.95 The fact that the majority of moviegoers choose to sit in the
stadium section supports the DOJ's position.96 The DOJ therefore
reasons that the usual wheelchair placement should be changed to
give wheelchair patrons sight lines "equivalent to or better than the
viewing angles provided by 50 percent of the seats in the auditorium,"
by placing wheelchair seats in the stadium section.
97
Section 4.33.3 is also interpreted to mean that wheelchair locations
must be provided with comparable, unobstructed views to the
91. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
92. The D.C. Arena court held that no authoritative interpretation of the phrase "lines of sight
comparable" was ever issued until 1994, when the DOJ's Technical Assistance Manual (TAM)
supplement was published. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C.
Cir. 1997). For specifics on the DOJ's interpretation, see United States Department of Justice,
The ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual § 111-7.5180 (Supp. 1994), at http://www.usdoj.
gov/crt/ada/taman3.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). The main controversy surrounding the
DOJ's 1994 Technical Assistance Manual (TAM) Supplement is "whether it is a valid interpreta-
tion of a pre-existing regulation" or merely an attempt to issue a new regulation. Id.
93. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1130. The DOJ presented this interpretation in
an amicus brief filed in 2000 in Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000). Lines
of sight mean the lines "extending from the viewer's eye to the points on the screen where the
film is projected, taking into account the angle from the viewer's eye to those points." Or. Para-
lyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1131.
94. Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 69 Fed. Appx. 19, 23 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. (emphasis omitted).
96. Id. (emphasis omitted).
97. See Access Board's comments in 64 Fed. Reg. 62,248, 62,278 (Nov. 16, 1999).
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require that wheelchair patrons have comparably unobstructed views
and viewing angles. 99
a. Due Deference to DOJ Interpretation?
Whether or not the DOJ's interpretation is entitled to deference is
an issue raised in many of the litigated stadium-style movie theater
cases. The general rule is that "[a] court must give deference to the
interpretation of a regulation by the agency charged with enforcing
that regulation unless that agency's interpretation is 'plainly erroneous
or inconsistent' with the regulation."10 0 Courts must defer to the
agency's interpretation of a regulation, unless alternative readings are
compelled by the regulation's plain language or by indications of the
agency's intent during promulgation.10 The Supreme Court has
noted, however, that deference was inappropriate where the agency's
position is not a "'reasoned and consistent view"' and contrary to
views advocated in past cases. 102 Thus, courts must decide whether
the DOJ's interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the history
of the regulation in order to defer to it.103 Several district courts have
differed on the question of whether deference ought to be afforded to
the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3.104
98. In December 1994, the DOJ published, without notice and comment, its TAM Supplement
explicitly stating that "lines of sight comparable" required sightlines unobstructed by standing
spectators. Milani, supra note 32, at 532. For a discussion of notice and comment requirements,
see infra note 190. Theaters can achieve unobstructed views by elevating wheelchair seating,
positioning areas for wheelchairs toward the front of the seating sections, or by placing the
wheelchair locations at the back so that patrons' views are not blocked by the people in front of
them. 1994 DOJ TAM Supp. § 111-7.5180. available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3up.
html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
99. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 563 (1st Cir. 2004).
100. Meineker, 69 Fed. Appx. at 23.
101. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
102. Meineker, 69 Fed. Appx. at 23-24.
103. Interpretations are considered reasonable when they "sensibly conform[ ] to the purpose
and wording of the regulations." Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1131 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
104. See Meineker, 69 Fed. Appx. at 24. The ADAAG's sightlines issue was finally addressed
when this Notice was issued. The Access Board's proposed rules were based on recommenda-
tions made by the ADAAG Review Advisory Committee, a group formed in 1994 consisting of
twenty-two representatives from "the design and construction industry, the building code com-
munity, State and local government entities, and people with disabilities." 64 Fed. Reg.
62,248-49 (Nov. 16, 1999).
2005] OREGON PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA 603
4. The Access Board's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On November 16, 1999, the Access Board issued a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking that acknowledged the DOJ's interpretation of
section 4.33.3 with respect to stadium-style movie theaters.'0 5 In it,
the Access Board said it was only considering whether section 4.33.3
should be modified to reflect the DOJ's interpretation.
10 6
After taking the issue under consideration, the Access Board recog-
nized that additional language was needed to give effect to the DOJ's
interpretation. 10 7 In July of 2004, it amended the ADAAG.
0 8
5. The Access Board's Amendment to the ADAAG
The Access Board amendment, effective September 1, 2004, calls
for wheelchair patrons to have the option of choosing from a variety
of seating locations within theaters of capacities over 300 so that their
viewing angles equal or surpass those of all the other patrons.' 0 9 Sta-
dium seating or "vertical dispersal," would not be required in smaller
theaters, those under 300, if the wheelchair locations presented view-
ing angles that equaled or surpassed the average viewing angle in the
theater.110 In light of this amendment, the DOJ has announced plans
"to revise its Title III regulations" in January 2005.'11 This amend-
ment is significant in that not all wheelchair seating is required in sta-
dium sections. Smaller theaters can keep wheelchair patrons in the
traditional section as long as the viewing angles meet the average
equivalent. 112 This does, however, present some ambiguity because it
is not a firm requirement."
3
105. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. 1-99-CV-705, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 24418, at
*18 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2001).
106. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,277-78.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 565 (1st Cir. 2004).
109. Id. (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 44,084, 44,198 (July 23, 2004) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191,
app. B, § 221)). The amendment was approved on January 14, 2004, and went into effect as part
of the revised ADAAG on September 21, 2004. Laura K. McKibbin, Comment, The ADA Takes
on the Movie Industry: Do the Disabled Have a Right to the Best Seats in the House?, 38 U.S.F.L.
REV. 831, 849 (2004).
110. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 565. (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 44,084, 44,198 (July 23, 2004) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. B, § 221)).
111. Id. at 565 n.6.
112. Id. at 565.
113. See McKibbin, supra note 109, at 852 (arguing that although theaters should still place
wheelchair seats in the stadium section, the DOJ must clarify whether smaller theaters are re-
quired to in order to avoid future litigation).
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F. Relevant Case Law
1. No "Wheelchair Ghettos": Cases Involving Traditional-Style
Movie Theaters: Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.
In 1994, Marc Fiedler, a disabled moviegoer, brought suit against
AMC Theaters. 114 At the theater he attended, wheelchair seating was
only made available in the last row of seats at the back of the thea-
ter.115 Fiedler argued this seating violated Title III of the ADA, spe-
cifically section 4.33.3, in that AMC deprived him of full and equal
enjoyment of the theater facilities by relegating him to the back of the
theater.' 6 AMC claimed its theater fell under the exception to sec-
tion 4.33.3, which allowed public accommodations to "cluster" wheel-
chair seating at one location in "bleachers, balconies, and other areas
having sight lines that require slopes of greater than 5 percent. 1 1 7
AMC and Fiedler disagreed about the interpretation of the excep-
tion in section 4.33.3. AMC argued that section 4.33.3's exception
should be interpreted to mean that wheelchair seating does not have
to be dispersed if the slope of the aisle in a theater exceeds five per-
cent. 1 8 Fiedler and the DOJ maintained that section 4.33.3's excep-
tion had nothing to do with the slope of the floors and aisles, and
everything to do with "the angle of vision between spectator and spec-
tacle." 119 The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia held that the DOJ, as author of the regulation, is the "principal
arbiter" of its meaning.' 20 Thus, the court concluded that AMC could
not relegate wheelchair seating to the back of its theaters. 12 1
AMC also argued that, in an emergency, a wheelchair patron could
get in the way of other patrons trying to exit the premises, and thus,
dispersal of wheelchair seating was not required.1 22 Fiedler contended
he posed no such danger. The court, however, found AMC's argu-
ment persuasive and called for an "individualized assessment" to de-
114. Fiedler v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 35, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
118. Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 38.
119. Id. The DOJ's interpretation amounted to the following: disabled people are to have
equal access to both the least and most desirable seats at theatrical events. Id.
120. Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 39.
121. Id. See also Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 712 (D. Or. 1997)
(arguing that an arena owner may not create a "wheelchair ghetto" that consigns wheelchair
users to the least desirable seats in the house). These "wheelchair ghettos" were particularly
"troubling" to this court as well as subsequent courts in part because African-American
moviegoers used to be regularly restricted to "'colored balconies"' and were "unable to join the
majority of patrons in the theater's more desirable seats." See Comment, supra note 69, at 734.
122. Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 39.
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termine whether Fiedler's presence near the front of the theater
"pose[d] a significant threat to his fellow theater-goers. ' ' 123 If such
presence would constitute a "'direct threat to the health or safety of
others,"' AMC would not be obligated to comply with the ADA.124
2. Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc.: Holding Section 4.33.3's "Lines of
Sight Comparable" Language Only Applies to Unobstructed
Views of the Screen
Significantly, Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc.125 appears to be the only
case to hold that section 4.33.3 does not apply to viewing angles. De-
fendant Cinemark challenged the determination of the District Court
for the Western District of Texas that the ADA required stadium-style
theaters "to offer wheelchair patrons lines of sight comparable to
those enjoyed by the general public."'1 26 Cinemark owned a chain of
theaters where, because of a steep grade, stadium seating was inacces-
sible to wheelchairs. 127 A group of disabled patrons and two advocacy
groups brought suit alleging the theaters relegated wheelchair-users to
inferior seating areas in violation of section 4.33.3.128
Cinemark first argued that the "lines of sight comparable" provision
only applied to theaters with capacities over three hundred, and thus,
its theaters with seating for under three hundred people were explic-
itly permitted to provide wheelchair seating in a single area.129 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the "lines of sight" language re-
quired more than mere dispersal. 130 It concluded that there were
"two independent requirements" necessitated by section 4.33.3: (1)
that theaters with more than three hundred seats are required to des-
ignate areas for wheelchairs in at least two locations; and (2) that
smaller theaters provide "comparable" sightlines and ticket prices for
all patrons.' 3 '
123. Id. at 40.
124. Id. at 39 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (2000)).
125. 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000).
126. Id. at 784.
127. Id. at 785.
128. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that they were not given comfortable viewing angles because
Cinemark had placed wheelchair seating in areas "too near the screen and too far below screen-
level." Id. The average viewing angle in Cinemark's theaters was about thirty-five degrees,
which the district court found uncomfortable. Id. at 786.
129. Lara, 207 F.3d at 786-87.
130. The court reasoned that the "lines of sight" language differed from the dispersal require-
ment, that the phrase "choice of" only modified ticket prices and not lines of sight, and to hold
otherwise allowed smaller theaters to avoid the requirements of section 4.33.3. Id. at 787.
131. Id. at 787-88.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
More successfully, Cinemark argued that its theaters gave wheel-
chair patrons "lines of sight comparable" because wheelchair seating
is free from obstructions and placed in the middle of general seat-
ing.' 32 The court noted that no other court had yet considered
whether theaters must provide wheelchair seating areas "with 'view-
ing angles' as comfortable as those enjoyed by the general public. ' 133
Questions regarding viewing angles in entertainment facilities did not
begin until after the DOJ issued section 4.33.3.134 Persuaded by the
lack of clear meaning of the phrase "lines of sight" in the ADA con-
text at the time the DOJ adopted section 4.33.3, the common meaning
of "lines of sight," and the lack of evidence that the Access Board
intended section 4.33.3 to impose a viewing angle requirement, 135 the
court concluded that the phrase only required that movie theaters
provide lines of sight free from obstructions.1 36 Essentially, section
4.33.3 does not require that theaters provide wheelchair patrons "with
the same viewing angles available to the majority of non-disabled
patrons." 37
3. Cases Holding section 4.33.3s "Lines of Sight Comparable"
Language Applies to Both Unobstructed Views and Viewing
Angles
This section discusses the cases that have agreed with the Ninth Cir-
cuit, and its Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America decision, and held
that section 4.33.3's "lines of sight comparable" language applies to
both unobstructed views and viewing angles.
132. Id. at 788.
133. The court found that a number of courts had already considered whether section 4.33.3
required auditoriums to provide wheelchair seating with lines of sight unobstructed by standing
spectators. Id. See, e.g., Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730, 736 (3d
Cir. 1999); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that the language of section 4.33.3 is subject to the DOJ's interpretation and that the DOJ
never adopted a position contrary to the interpretation set forth in the 1994 TAM); and Indep.
Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 743 (D. Or. 1997).
134. Lara, 207 F.3d at 788.
135. The court did not want to impose a viewing angle requirement without evidence of Ac-
cess Board intent because, as it noted, to do so "would require district courts to interpret the
ADA based upon the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of disabled moviegoers."
Lara, 207 F.3d at 789. In other contexts, however, the phrase clearly means unobstructed view.
See id. at 788-89 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.685 (2000) (discussing the FCC regulation that requires
that antennae have lines of sight without obstruction)); id. (citing 36 C.F.R. § 2.18 (2000) (dis-
cussing the regulation that permits those under age sixteen to drive snowmobiles as long as they
are "within line of sight" of someone responsible who is over twenty-one years old)).
136. Lara, 207 F.3d at 788-89.
137. Id. at 789.
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a. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp.
Decided in August, 2004, United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp. was
one of many cases to hold that section 4.33.3 applies to both unob-
structed views and viewing angles.' 38 In that case, the government
sued over five hundred individual movie theaters throughout the
United States.1 39 The government argued that two cinema chains' sta-
dium-style theaters denied wheelchair users "equal access to the sta-
dium section," in violation of Title III of the ADA and section
4.33.3.140
According to the government, both Hoyts' and National Amuse-
ments' theaters violated the ADA because they banished disabled pa-
trons to the "worst seats in the theater, which are closest to the screen
and... provide[d] wheelchair-bound theater patrons with the poorest
viewing angles. '141 The cinema chains argued that they complied with
section 4.33.3, in accordance with Lara, by providing wheelchair seats
among general public seating with unobstructed views to the screen.
142
They also contended that the government was trying to make a new
rule by interpreting the ADAAG "beyond recognition.' '1 43
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
found the Lara reasoning flawed for several reasons, 144 and deferred
to what it found to be a reasonable interpretation of section 4.33.3.
The court held that the "lines of sight comparable" requirement of
section 4.33.3 applied to viewing angles and that wheelchair seating in
the traditional section did not offer "lines of sight comparable to those
138. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004).
139. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75 (D. Mass. 2003), vacated by
380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004). Forty-one of Hoyts' theaters and fifty-two of National Amuse-
ments' theaters had capacities of 300 or more, and provided wheelchairs access to the stadium
section via elevator. Id. at 80.
140. Id. at 74. Both Hoyts' and National Amusements' theaters placed wheelchair-accessible
seating along the access aisle in the traditional section. Id. at 80.
141. Id. at 82.
142. Id. The two theater chains argued that the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 re-
quired that wheelchair seating "provide a better viewing angle than most seats in the theater,
including many in the stadium section." Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 82. The court replied
that it did not require wheelchair seating to be the "best seats in the house;" only that they could
not be the worst. Id. at 88.
143. Id. at 82. Hoyts and National Amusements argued that instead of stretching its interpre-
tation of section 4.33.3 and bringing suit, the Government should change the regulations. Id.
144. This court agreed with the Government that the Lara court: (1) "decided the case with-
out any support in the regulation's language for [its] interpretation;" (2) "relied on a history that
only looked at Technical Assistance Manuals written before stadium seating had been invented;"
(3) "did not grant deference;" and (4) "selectively quoted proposed regulations to bolster its
holding and ignored sections that took viewing angles into account." Id. at 84 (citation omitted).
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for members of the general public.' 45 Accordingly, wheelchair seat-
ing in the access aisle, in the traditional section, or both did not satisfy
section 4.33.3.146 Compliance with "lines of sight comparable" re-
quired the theaters to offer wheelchair seating in the stadium sec-
tion.147 The court's holding was applicable prospectively to the
construction or refurbishment of theaters occurring on or after com-
mencement of the suit.148 The holding was not retroactively applied.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
addressed three issues: (1) whether section 4.33.3 encompasses unob-
structed views and viewing angles; (2) whether "wheelchair placement
in the stadium section is automatically required for all stadium thea-
ters based on the alleged factual superiority of such seating;" and (3)
whether the district court's ruling on retroactivity was correct.149
First, the court held that section 4.33.3 takes viewing angles into
account.150 Because "lines of sight" is a "fairly general phrase," it is
"capable of encompassing" both physical obstructions and viewing an-
gles. 151 Furthermore, the court found that the underlying policy of the
ADA, equality of access, was best carried out by applying section
4.33.3 to viewing angles, and in doing so, gave weight to the DOJ's
interpretation.152
Second, although the court deferred to the DOJ's interpretation, it
disagreed with the "integral" requirement that "wheelchair spaces al-
ways be placed in the stadium section."'15 3 The court distinguished
two possible positions: (1) that section 4.33.3 requires wheelchair seat-
ing in the stadium section even if the quality of viewing angles in the
traditional section are just as good; and (2) that wheelchair seating in
the stadium section is required only when the view from the tradi-
tional section is "worse than from the stadium."'1 54 The court con-
145. Id. at 88.
146. Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. at 93.
147. Id. Furthermore, the court held that the section 4.33.3 requirement that wheelchair-ac-
cessible seating comprise an "integral part" of any fixed seating plan also required that wheel-
chair seats be made available in the stadium section since "[sleats in a separate front section
where no-one would sit willingly, given the superiority of the stadium section are neither 'neces-
sary' nor 'part of' the whole." Id. at 89. While section 4.33.3 does permit all wheelchair seating
to be put in the same place and clustered, that "same place" must be in the stadium section. Id.
at 88.
148. Id. at 93.
149. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 565 (1st Cir. 2004).
150. Id. at 566.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 567. The DOJ interpreted section 4.33.3 to mean that "lines of sight comparable"
applied to viewing angles in addition to physical obstructions. Id. at 563.
153. Id. at 567-68 (emphasis added).
154. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 568.
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cluded that the second position was more appropriate, and that a
blanket determination that all traditional section wheelchair seats are
inferior, no matter the theater's size or configuration, was "multiply
flawed."'1 55 The court held, however, that the government still had a
case in that some, if not most, of defendants' theaters violated section
4.33.3, but it had to "abandon the all-or-nothing approach" and deal
with theaters or groups of theaters on an individual basis. 156
Third, the court discussed retroactivity and found that the defend-
ants, although they complied with the minimum required by law,
could not impose bad viewing angles on wheelchair patrons since to
do so clearly hindered the ADA's objectives. 157 The court found that
retroactive application of the viewing angle requirement was possibly
unfair depending on the obligations "ultimately imposed on the de-
fendants."'1 58 When even the smallest alteration could result in the
complete restructuring of a theater, the issue is an important one and
"[s]uch concerns underscore the need for the parties to have due no-
tice and be given an opportunity to argue about retroactivity after the
prospective obligations have been established. '159
Finally, the court stressed the importance of each party showing "an
equal dedication" to working out a settlement.160 It also stated that
the Access Board's amendment to the ADAAG would go "a long way
to determining for the future the extremely difficult question of how
much 'comparability' is required for new construction."' 161 The court
said no solution to existing theaters would be perfect and that
''prompt improvements" were more important than "theoretical
perfection. 1 62 It then vacated the judgment of the district court and
remanded the matter.1 63
b. Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp.
In Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp.,164 the plaintiffs were two dis-
abled patrons who argued that the wheelchair-accessible seating in
Hoyts' theaters with capacities under three hundred violated Title III
155. Id. at 570.
156. Id. at 572.
157. Id. at 573.
158. Id. at 573-74.
159. Id. at 574.
160. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 575.
161. Id. at 575.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 69 Fed. Appx. 19 (2d Cir. 2003).
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of the ADA. 165 In fourteen of the eighteen theaters at issue, wheel-
chair seating was located at the rear of the traditional section, and "as
close to the center of the theater as possible."'1 66
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York agreed with the DOJ interpretation and held that the lines of
sight offered to wheelchair patrons must be "similar" and not just
"similarly unobstructed" to the lines of sight offered to the general
public. 167 In addition, the court ruled that theaters with wheelchair
seating in the very front rows of the traditional section do not provide
"lines of sight comparable" in accordance with section 4.33.3.168 The
district court declined, however, to find a violation of Title III of the
ADA and held that wheelchair seating at the rear of the traditional
section and in the center of the theater satisfied the requirements of
section 4.33.3. The Court found no violation of the "integral" require-
ment of section 4.33.3.169 The district court reasoned that the excep-
tion to section 4.33.3 permitted the clustering of wheelchair seating as
long as it is located among general public seating, which the court con-
sidered the traditional section to be.170
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit addressed whether the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 was
entitled to deference, and, if so, whether Hoyts Cinemas had sufficient
notice of the interpretation to require compliance with it.171 The
Court of Appeals ultimately remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the DOJ interpretation was a "'fair and consid-
ered judgment' consistent with the history of the regulation," and
whether Hoyts had sufficient notice. 172 The court noted six factors
relevant in a sufficient notice determination: (1) the theater's "notice
of, and intent to comply with, the requirements of the ADA at the
time of construction or renovation" of its theaters; (2) the theater's
"position in previous legal communications . .. regarding lines of
sight;" (3) the information known to the theater's architect "at the
time of construction or renovation" (and his or her understanding of
165. Id. at 21.
166. Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 14, 15 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
167. Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
168. Id. The wheelchair seating in Hoyts' theaters was modified during this litigation. When
the plaintiffs first brought suit, the theaters placed all wheelchair seating in the very front row.
Meineker, 69 Fed. Appx. at 21. Had they kept the seating in that location, the court would have
likely found them in violation of Title III of the ADA. However, Hoyts escaped liability by
changing the placement of wheelchair seating to the middle-rear of the traditional section.
169. Meineker, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
170. Id.
171. Meineker, 69 Fed. Appx. at 23.
172. Id. at 25.
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lines of sight); (4) the theater's principals' understanding of the mean-
ing of lines of sight; (5) "the industry's understanding of the terms
used in [section] 4.33.3, including 'comparable lines of sight' at the
time of construction and renovation" of the theaters; and (6) "cus-
tomer seating preference data."17
3
On remand, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of New York held that no expert testimony was needed to apply
the DOJ's interpretation regardless of whether or not it was given def-
erence.174 The court never addressed whether the DOJ's interpreta-
tion was indeed entitled to deference.
c. United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc.
AMC Theaters, a nationwide movie theater chain, provided wheel-
chair seating in the traditional section of the theater, and the govern-
ment brought suit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California for violating Title III of the ADA.175 Using the
DOJ interpretation of section 4.33.3, the government moved for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of whether its interpretation was reasona-
ble and entitled to deference.1 76
The court granted summary judgment on the "lines of sight" issue,
holding that the government's position was the "fair and considered
judgment of the DOJ" and a reasonable interpretation. 77 It also held
that AMC knew, or should have known, that "lines of sight compara-
ble" referred to both viewing angles and possible obstructions, and
was therefore obligated to provide disabled patrons with comparable
viewing angles.' 78 As a result of its placement of wheelchair seating in
the traditional section of the theater, AMC's stadium-style theaters
violated section 4.33.3.179
AMC raised several arguments. First, it argued that there was no
evidence the Access Board or DOJ considered the issue of stadium-
style theaters when section 4.33.3 was promulgated.1 80 Additionally, it
173. Id.
174. Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 325 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
175. United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
176. Id. at 1108.
177. Id. at 1113.
178. Id. at 1111. Comparable "imposes a qualitative requirement that the sight line be 'simi-
lar' and not merely 'similarly unobstructed."' Id. at 1112 (quoting Meineker v. Hoyts Cinemas
Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 14 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)).
179. Id. This is not a per se rule-the requirements of viewing angle comparability vary based
on individual theaters' layout. The court only held that a wheelchair patron's movie-going expe-
rience had to approximate that of a nondisabled patron. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1112
n.19.
180. Id. at 1113.
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argued that the "lines of sight comparable" provision, prior to the
DOJ's interpretation, was "too vague to provide them with [the] fair
warning" required by due process.181 The court rejected both argu-
ments, stating that section 4.33.3 was not "static and inflexible. '1 8 2
The government did not violate due process in its retroactive applica-
tion of the DOJ's interpretation, even though it gave no fair warning
to theaters as to what may be prohibited.183
Approximately three months later, AMC filed a Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on the "lines of sight" issue, which the court de-
nied. 184 The court decided to wait and see how the Ninth Circuit case
of Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas was de-
cided before ruling on the "lines of sight" issue. 85 No further action
has been taken since then.
d. United States v. Cinemark, USA Inc.
In another case involving Cinemark, the government brought suit
against Cinemark contending that its theaters violated Title III of the
ADA and the corresponding regulations. 186 Cinemark operated a
chain of stadium-style theaters with wheelchair seating in front of the
stadium section.187 The government argued that section 4.33.3 re-
quired Cinemark to provide comparable lines of sight to disabled pa-
trons by offering wheelchair seating with "viewing angles, distance to
the screen, obstruction of view and distortion of images" comparable
to those offered to the majority of non-disabled patrons. 188
Cinemark relied on the reasoning in Lara and argued that it was
persuasive because the DOJ's position was the same as it was in Lara,
where the Fifth Circuit rejected it, and because all of Cinemark's sta-
dium-style theaters met the accessibility requirements upheld in
Lara.a89 Cinemark also argued the DOJ's position violated the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act because it had satisfied the DOJ-certified
181. Id. at 1114.
182. Id. at 1111.
183. Id. at 1114.
184. Id. at 1101.
185. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
186. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. 1-99-CV-705, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24418, at
*6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2001).
187. Id. at *2-3. Cinemark's theaters with capacities over 300 provided elevator access to
seats in the rear of the stadium section. Id. at *3.
188. Id. at *11 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government be-
lieved Cinemark's location of wheelchair seating to be the "worst in the house." Id. at *12.
189. Id. at *16-17 (citation omitted).
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state accessibility guidelines and received approval to proceed with its
stadium-style theaters.' 90
Although the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio, Eastern Division followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
in Lara and held that the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 was
not controlling,1 91 the Sixth Circuit reversed because it found the plain
meaning of section 4.33.3 required more than just unobstructed
views. 192 It remanded the case to the district court "to determine the
extent to which lines of sight must be similar for wheelchair patrons"
in theaters with stadium seating.' 93 In "fashioning [a] remedy" for the
remedial measures imposed by deference to the DOJ's interpretation,
the court ordered the district court to "take into account [any] previ-
ous advice and representations by the government upon which
Cinemark ... reasonably relied."'
1 94
III. SUBJECT OPINION: OREGON PARALYZED VETERANS OF
AMERICA V. REGAL CINEMAS
This section presents the subject opinion of this Note: the Ninth
Circuit case of Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cine-
mas, Inc. This case marked the first time since Lara v. Cinemark
USA, Inc. that another Court of Appeals addressed the issue of view-
ing angles in stadium-style movie theatres. It continues to be relevant
because its influence is found in the later decisions of the Sixth Circuit
and First Circuit. The facts, prior history, arguments presented, hold-
ing, reasoning, and dissenting opinion are all discussed below.
190. See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (2000). The notice and comment provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) require administrative agencies that promulgate substan-
tive legislative regulations, such as the DOJ, "to explain the proposed rule's purpose and justifi-
cation, respond to significant criticisms, and explain why the agency decided to maintain or alter
the proposed rule." See Milani, supra note 32, at 548-49 (discussing Indep. Living Res. v. Or.
Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 740 (D. Or. 1997)). Interpretative rules, in contrast, do not
require a notice and comment period prior to promulgation. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000). Inter-
pretive rules state what the agency believes the statute to mean and only reminds affected par-
ties of their already existing duties. See Milani, supra note 32, at 563 (citation omitted).
Substantive rules are intended to make new law and duties. Id. To survive APA challenges, the
DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 must be viewed as an interpretive rule, since it was issued
without any notice or comment. Kurack, supra note 92, at *3. According to Cinemark, the
DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 operated as an impermissible new rule of law. Cinemark
USA, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24418, at *17 (citation omitted). Cinemark argued that the
DOJ had already certified local guidelines "as 'meeting or exceeding the standards of the
ADAAG."' Id. (quoting Cinemark Mem. at 13).
191. Cinemark USA, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24418, at *21.
192. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2003).
193. Id. at 579.
194. Id. at 582-83.
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A. Facts
Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas is an im-
portant example of both courts' eagerness to defer to the DOJ's inter-
pretation of section 4.33.3, and their inability to grasp the practical
ramifications such deference has on movie theaters. 95 The plaintiffs
were three wheelchair patrons from Oregon.196 The defendants were
two theater chains, Regal Cinemas, Inc. and Eastgate Theatre, Inc.
(referred to collectively as "Regal"). Regal operates a nationwide
theater chain and has more movie screens in its theaters than any
other chain in the United States.197 Like other theater chains at the
time, Regal first constructed stadium-style theaters in 1995.198 This
case involved six of Regal's stadium-style theaters in Northern Ore-
gon, the majority of which have less than 250 seats each, and tiers of
stadium seats with a rise of up to eighteen inches. 199 Regal's theaters
were separated into stadium and traditional sections by an aisle, with
wheelchair-accessible seating located in the first five rows of the tradi-
tional section and adjacent to general public seating. 200 All wheel-
chair-accessible seats in Regal's stadium-style theaters had
unobstructed views of the screen.20'
Since patrons must use stairs to get to the stadium seating, wheel-
chair patrons were restricted from sitting in the stadium seats, and
were forced to sit in the first few rows of the theater on a sloped floor,
where the vertical viewing angle is sharper.20 2 The plaintiffs alleged
that they found it difficult to enjoy the movie they were watching and
experienced nausea, headaches, and discomfort while sitting in these
seats.203 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
195. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
196. Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America (OPVA) was the fourth plaintiff in the original
lawsuit, but is not a party in this appeal. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Appellants and Urging Reversal [hereinafter Brief Supporting Appellants] at 5, Or. Para-
lyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-35554),
available at 2001 WL 34134395.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Appellees' Brief at 4, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554), available at 2002
WL 32154039. Because all six theaters were designed and constructed after January 26, 1993,
they are "new construction" subject to the requirements of Title III. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of
Am., 339 F.3d at 1127 n.2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Appellees' Brief at 4, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554).
201. Id. at 4.
202. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1127-28. The plaintiffs' experts conducted
research at Regal's theaters and found the vertical viewing angles ranged from twenty-four to
sixty degrees, with a forty-two degree average. Id. at 1128.
203. Id. at 1127-28.
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Circuit considered whether the stadium seating in Regal's six theaters
violated Title III of the ADA.
20 4
B. Prior History
Both the plaintiffs and Regal moved for summary judgment in dis-
trict court. The United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon denied the plaintiffs' motion, but granted Regal's motion for
summary judgment. It relied on and adopted the Fifth Circuit's rea-
soning in Lara, and in so doing, rejected the DOJ's interpretation of
section 4.33.3 as "inconsistent with the regulation and therefore not
entitled to deference. '20 5 The district court, like the Lara court, held
that the phrase "lines of sight comparable" in section 4.33.3 did not
require wheelchair patrons to have viewing angles comparable to
those of non-disabled patrons.20 6 The district court found support in
the fact that the stadium design in movie theaters was not developed
until four years after the DOJ promulgated section 4.33.3.207
C. Arguments Presented
The plaintiffs alleged that wheelchair users "do not receive the ben-
efit" of the increased comfort, unobstructed views, and improved
movie-going experience that Regal's stadium-style seating provides.
20 8
Instead, they are confronted with the "significant" disadvantages that
accompany wheelchair-accessible seating placement in the first few
rows.209 The plaintiffs also claimed that because most patrons choose
to sit in the stadium section of the theater, wheelchair users are "effec-
tively segregate[d]" from most other members of the audience in be-
ing relegated to the traditional section. 210 Wheelchair users also do
not have the luxury of getting their choice of seat by arriving early-
no matter when they arrive, they still have to sit in the "undesirable
spaces designated for their use."
211
204. Id. Two issues addressed by the court, which will not be addressed by this Note were: (1)
whether the seating plans violated Oregon's public accommodations statute; and (2) whether
Regal was negligent in its design, construction, and operation of its stadium-style theaters. Id.
205. Id. at 1130.
206. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1129.
207. Id. at 1130.
208. Brief Supporting Appellants at 6, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Arn. (No. 01-35554).
209. These disadvantages include: looking up at the screen at sharp angles, severe discomfort
and pain, difficulty in focusing on the picture, blurry and distorted images on screen, and dizzi-
ness or nausea. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 7.
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The plaintiffs claimed that these alleged conditions violated Title III
of the ADA. First, they argued for adoption of the DOJ interpreta-
tion of section 4.33.3: "lines of sight comparable" requires that view-
ing angles in movie theaters be comparable to those of the general
public. 212 The plaintiffs argued the DOJ's interpretation was, at the
very least, reasonable, and therefore entitled to deference. 213 Since
the DOJ has principal authority to administer provisions of the ADA,
the plaintiffs argued that its interpretations are entitled to deference
unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, '2 14 and
that the DOJ reasonably concluded that factors in addition to physical
obstructions, like viewing angles and distance from the screen, "affect
whether individuals' views of the movie screen are truly
equivalent." 215
The plaintiffs characterized the Lara court's reasoning as "funda-
mentally flawed" and opposed both the common usage of the term
"lines of sight," 216 and one of Title III's central goals, to provide
"equal enjoyment" of the benefits of a movie theater. The plaintiffs
argued that the quality of one's viewing experience factors into the
ADA's goal to provide "equal enjoyment" of a movie theater's bene-
fits. 217 The plaintiffs further distinguished Lara by arguing that the
DOJ's authority is not limited by factual situations that were unantici-
pated when the regulation was issued.218 The DOJ can still apply the
broad language of section 4.33.3 to stadium-style theaters even though
the Access Board did not use the term "viewing angle" when promul-
gating the ADAAG. 219 According to the plaintiffs, it was the DOT's
views, as opposed to the Access Board's, to which courts owe defer-
ence in determining the meaning of section 4.33.3.220 In their replace-
ment brief, the plaintiffs went on to argue that the Access Board
"plainly understood" that lines of sight included viewing angles. 221
212. Id. at 10.
213. Id. at 11.
214. Brief Supporting Appellants at 12, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554) (citing
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
215. Id.
216. The plaintiffs cite the SMPTE Engineering Guidelines, a NATO position paper stating
that "lines of sight are measured in degrees" and indicating that viewing angles are a component
of lines of sight, and the Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony case: "viewing angles can affect the quality
of lines of sight for purposes of [section] 4.33.3." Id. at 16 (citing Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony
Music Entm't Centre, 193 F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1999)).
217. Id. at 14.
218. Id. at 18-19.
219. See ADAAG for Buildings and Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408 (July 26, 1991).
220. Brief Supporting Appellants at 20, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554).
221. Appellants' Replacement Brief at 21, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554),
available at 2001 WL 34134394.
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Second, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in finding
section 4.33.3 applicable to obstructions and not viewing angles.
2 22
The plaintiffs said the plain meaning of the regulation required that
wheelchair users be given comparable viewing angles to those of the
general public. 22 3 They found error in the district court's reliance on
the Fifth Circuit decision in Lara, and its rejection of the "plain mean-
ing" interpretation.2 24 The plaintiffs argued that both the Access
Board and Motion Picture Industry understood that lines of sight re-
ferred to both viewing angles and unobstructed views.225 They found
the Access Board's recognition that the first few rows of a theater
provide "'inferior lines of sight'" persuasive. 226 The plaintiffs also as-
serted that the DOJ interpretation was not new because it was set
forth in 1994 and has been consistently interpreted since then.
227
Thus, the plaintiffs argued that they were entitled to summary judg-
ment and that the district court's decision against them should be
reversed. 228
Regal urged the court to affirm the district court's decision and hold
its seating plans complied with section 4.33.3.229 Relying on what it
deemed the "well-reasoned" decisions of the Fifth Circuit in Lara, and
the Northern District of Ohio in United States v. Cinemark, Regal ar-
gued that the "lines of sight comparable" provision of section 4.33.3
referred to unobstructed views, not viewing angles.230 Regal pointed
out that in both cases, the courts found insufficient evidence that ei-
ther the DOJ or the Access Board had intended section 4.33.3 to refer
to viewing angles at the time the regulation was passed.
231
Regal found support for the district court's decision in the meaning
of section 4.33.3's language when issued. First, Regal argued that sec-
tion 4.33.3's plain language, context, and well-understood meaning in-
dicated that the phrase "lines of sight comparable" referred only to
222. Id. at 31.
223. Id. at 14-15. The plaintiffs also raised an integration argument that the court chose not
to address. See Comment, supra note 69, at 727. Their argument was that because floor seats
are undesirable for most patrons and because so few actually choose to sit in them, people with
disabilities were segregated. Id.
224. Appellants' Replacement Brief at 18, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554),
available at 2001 WL 34134394.
225. Id. at 21.
226. Id. at 24.
227. Id. at 25-26.
228. Id. at 30.
229. Appellees' Brief at 2, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554), available at 2001
WL 32154039.
230. Id. at 17.
231. Id. at 20.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
obstruction. The phrase, "lines of sight comparable" had been utilized
in regulations since 1980 when the American National Standards Insti-
tute (ANSI) first expressed the concept in its uniform standards. 232
The Access Board used the phrase in its guidelines and the DOJ sub-
sequently adopted them in 1991.233 A similar phrase was also used in
the Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design
(MGRAD) under the Architectural Barriers Act234 and in the Uni-
form Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS),235 which was issued by
four federal agencies bound by the Access Board.236 Thus, even
though "thousands of movie theaters have been built since 1980,
ANSI, MGRAD, UFAS, and ADAAG have never been interpreted
to impose viewing angle requirements or quality of sight line consider-
ations. ' 237 Regal argued the plain meaning of "comparable" was met
because the unobstructed wheelchair seats were comparable to simi-
larly unobstructed seats for the general public.238 Regal noted that
the "relative degree of obstruction" takes on greater meaning in
sports arenas and live venues than it does in movie theaters. 239 Regal
alternatively argued that the exception to section 4.33.3 applied re-
gardless because its stadium-style theaters have floors that slope at a
rate of more than five percent (in order to provide unobstructed view-
ing over the heads and shoulders of others) and thus the wheelchair
seating can be "clustered" on "levels having accessible egress. '240
Additionally, Regal alleged that the DOJ's interpretation of section
4.33.3 should not be given due deference. 241 First, it found that the
Access Board's 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking indicated the
Access Board believed it was necessary to amend section 4.33.3 in or-
der to validly implement the DOJ's interpretation.242 According to
Regal, this notice confirmed that the DOJ interpretation was "not a
232. Id. at 22 (discussing 47 Fed. Reg. 33,862 (1982)).
233. Id.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12204(2) (2000). In 1982, the Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for
Accessible Design (MGRAD) used a phrase similar to "lines of sight comparable." Appellees'
Brief at 22, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12204(2) (1998)).
235. In 1989, the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) were issued and adopted
the Access Board's guidelines and the language of "lines of sight comparable." Id. (citing 49
Fed. Reg. 31,528 (1984)).
236. Appellees' Brief at 22, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554), available at 2001
WL 32154039.
237. Id. at 22-23.
238. Id. at 25.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Id. at 34.
242. Appellees' Brief at 27, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554), available at 2001
WL 32154039.
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statement of current accessibility requirements, but rather a prelimi-
nary 'notice and comment' proposal that ha[d] not yet been converted
into law."'2 43 Second, Regal characterized the DOJ's interpretation as
a "moving target" in that it had not been consistently interpreted in
the same manner and that the DOJ was "still in the process of
crafting. '244
Finally, Regal argued that acceptance of the DOJ's interpretation of
section 4.33.3 "[v]iolated the notice and comment requirements of the
APA and fundamental notions of due process. '2 45 Regal said that in
implementing Title III of the ADA, Congress understood that full and
fair notice, precise and objective building standards, and technical as-
sistance were required for architects and builders.246 Because public
accommodations are expensive to construct and difficult to conform
to all of the numerous and exacting objective building standards, clear
and unambiguous guidance must be given.247 Regal argued that ac-
ceptance of the plaintiff's position and the DOJ's interpretation
amounted to retroactive regulation, without notice and comment.
Such retroactivity is problematic in that it puts courts in the "ill-
equipped" position of making engineering, architectural, and policy
determinations regarding "whether a particular design feature is feasi-
ble and desirable. ' 248 Furthermore, requirements that can change ret-
roactively make it extremely difficult to design new public
accommodations structures. If retroactive application were allowed,
Regal argued, the court would "usurp" the powers of the Access
Board and DOJ, and thus violate the clear intentions of Congress.
2 49
Accordingly, Regal argued, legal requirements should be accom-
plished through APA notice and comment, not through litigation, and
the district court's ruling should be upheld.
250
D. Holding
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon and ex-
pressly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Lara.251 The
243. Id. at 27-28.
244. Id. at 36-37.
245. Id. at 38.
246. Id. at 5-6 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 12206(a) (2000)).
247. Id. at 15.
248. Appellees' Brief at 38-39, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-35554), available at
2001 WL 34134394.
249. Id. at 39.
250. Id. at 44.
251. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Ninth Circuit held that Regal's stadium seating did not constitute "full
and equal enjoyment" of movie theater services under Title III of the
ADA.252 The court upheld the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3,
requiring "a viewing angle for wheelchair seating within the range of
angles offered to the general public in the stadium-style seats," as a
valid interpretation entitled to due deference. 253 The case was then
remanded.2 54
E. Reasoning
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's suggestion that
"comparability" could not be determined without getting into subjec-
tive judgments on seat preference and found the lack of choice on the
part of wheelchair patrons to be decisive. 255 Whereas non-disabled
patrons could choose from a wide range of viewing angles, wheelchair
patrons could only sit in the first few rows, where the viewing angles
were considerably less comfortable. 256
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit that sta-
dium-style theaters did not exist at the time section 4.33.3 was issued,
and that older theaters did not have the same disparity in vertical
viewing angles that stadium theaters do, the court reasoned that
broadly drafted regulations may be applied to particular factual scena-
rios even though those scenarios were not expressly anticipated when
the regulation was passed.257 The court held that there was no "full
and equal enjoyment" for wheelchair patrons when they had to "crane
their necks and twist their bodies in order to see the screen," while
non-disabled patrons did not.258
F. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld disagreed with the majority. 259 Judge
Kleinfeld pointed to the majority's newly created conflict between the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and argued that the majority adopted "an
252. Id. at 1133. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit overlooked the portion of section 4.33.3 that
requires wheelchair seating to be integrated into general public seating ("Wheelchair areas shall
be an integral part of any fixed seating plan ...." See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
See also Comment, supra note 69, at 727.




257. Id. "[Wlhere statutory text is unambiguous, 'the fact that a statute can be applied in
situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demon-
strates breadth."' Id. (quoting Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)).
258. Or. Paralyzed Veterns of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133.
259. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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unreasonable construction" and put theaters "in a position of impossi-
ble uncertainty. '2 60
Judge Kleinfeld argued that the Access Board approach was at odds
with the majority's approach.261 Under the Access Board's approach,
architects and theater owners are given the information they need to
know in order to build new theaters and reconstruct existing ones.2 62
Under the majority approach, thousands of theaters will have failed to
comply with the law, and will have to "destroy facilities built in com-
pliance with the law according to the best knowledge of design profes-
sionals at the time. '263
Judge Kleinfeld also argued that the accessibility guidelines sur-
rounding section 4.33.3 are written with "great precision" and that the
"use of the vague term 'comparable' must be looser by intent."264
Furthermore, Judge Kleinfeld argued the DOJ interpretation equates
"comparable" to "better than" and that this position is not tenable
considering the difference in viewing angles at every seat and the
"highly subjective" nature of people's preferences.265 According to
Judge Kleinfeld, the lines of sight cannot be comparable to all the
seats in the house without scattering wheelchair areas, which section
4.33.3 does not require in theaters with capacities under three
hundred.2 66
Kleinfeld believed the only guidance the majority gave theater own-
ers was to stop what they are currently doing and to provide viewing
angles for wheelchair patrons "within the range of angles offered to
the general public. '267 Kleinfeld asked the majority to at least "offer
a holding that can be translated into a floorplan. ' 268 He concluded
that the best action for the court was to wait and see what the Access
Board decides, and found "no justification for jumping in front of
them. "269
260. Id. at 1133 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing 64 Fed. Reg. 62,248, 62,278 (Nov. 16, 1999)).
262. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
264. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1134-35 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). See also
supra note 133 and accompanying text.
265. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1135-36. Judge Kleinfeld argued that seats in
front were not less desirable because theaters did not charge less for them. Id. at 1136
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1137 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
This section presents an analysis of the key issues raised by the
Ninth Circuit in Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America: (1) the circuit
split between the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits; (2) the ambiguity of the
word "comparable;" (3) whether the DOJ's interpretation is worthy of
due deference; (4) the Access Board's involvement and recognition of
the problem; and (5) the dangers of retroactive regulation.
A. The Split Between the Ninth and Fifth Circuits: What Can Movie
Theaters Extract From the Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of
America Decision?
Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America is notable because it con-
flicts with and directly challenges the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lara v.
Cinemark. Stadium-style seating law is essentially in chaos because of
these and other conflicting rulings.270 The issue of whether the view-
ing angles offered to disabled patrons must be comparable to those
afforded to non-disabled patrons is placed at the forefront of movie
theater owners' and architects' concerns. The Ninth Circuit requires
comparable viewing angles, while the Fifth Circuit does not.271
The Fifth Circuit's decision imposes no additional legal require-
ments on stadium-style movie theaters: section 4.33.3's phrase "lines
of sight comparable" applies only to physical obstructions. 272 In the
majority of stadium-style theaters around the country, the architec-
tural designs and constructions have complied with the requirement to
provide wheelchair patrons with unobstructed views of the screen.273
The question of whether section 4.33.3 prohibits viewer obstruction
has never arisen because, as the Fifth Circuit reasoned, both "the DOJ
and Access Board explicitly considered [it] before issuing [S]ection
270. Meena Thiruvengadam, Theaters' Seating Takes a Hit, SAN ArrONlo EXPRESS-NEWS,
June 29, 2004, at 1D.
271. Compare Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d 1126 (requiring comparable viewing
angles), with Lara v. Cinemark USA Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000) (only requiring unob-
structed views).
272. Lara, 207 F.3d at 789.
273. Indeed, none of the cases dealing with issues surrounding the DOJ's interpretation of
section 4.33.3, as it relates to lines of sight in stadium-style movie theaters, have had to answer
questions relating to viewer obstruction. Some cases have ruled on the issue of viewer obstruc-
tion. One court held that section 4.33.3 requires auditorium owners to provide wheelchair areas
with lines of sight unobstructed by standing spectators. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C.
Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Others either held that section 4.33.3 does
not cover issues of unobstructed views over standing spectators or that such issues are unneces-
sary for ADA compliance. See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730, 736
(3d Cir. 1999), Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 743 (D. Or. 1997).
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4.33.3."274 On the other hand, questions regarding the comparability
of viewing angles did not arise until after the DOJ issued section
4.33.3.275
The Ninth Circuit found no justification in the fact that the question
did not arise until after promulgation of section 4.33.3.276 Although it
leads to a circuit split and the imposition of additional legal require-
ments on stadium-style movie theaters, the Ninth Circuit was entirely
justified in its ruling. 277 However, the Ninth Circuit's decision and
subsequent circuit split are problematic.
278
The first problem that results from the circuit split is that there is no
uniform regulation. For theater chains with stadium-style theaters
across the country, Ninth Circuit theaters will either have to undergo
significant renovations of their stadium seating sections or, depending
on the current design, face the possibility of destruction along with
costly and time-consuming reconstruction efforts.279 Meanwhile, the-
aters in the Fifth Circuit are allowed to maintain the status quo with
no additional legal requirements imposed.
2 0
For those concerned, namely the wheelchair patrons and movie the-
ater owners, the circuit split leads to incomparable seating in stadium-
style movie theaters across the country. This is a problem for wheel-
chair patrons in the Fifth Circuit because the circuit split ensures that
wheelchair users will be treated unequally. Some wheelchair patrons
will have seats provided in the stadium section and be able to enjoy
the "enhanced" movie-going experience, while others will not. If Title
III of the ADA requires "full and equal enjoyment, '281 then this result
is clearly a violation of that requirement, in theory if not in law. The
274. Lara, 207 F.3d at 788.
275. Id.
276. This fact was deemed "not dispositive." Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133.
277. "'[T]he courts do not require an agency of the United States to accept an adverse deter-
mination of the agency's statutory construction by any of the Circuit Courts of Appeals as bind-
ing on the agency for all similar cases throughout the United States."' United States v. AMC
Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 784 F.2d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 1986)). Courts review an agency's
statutory construction using a two-step process: (1) determine if Congress spoke to the issue-in-
question in the statute or legislative history; and (2) if Congress did delegate interpretative au-
thority to an agency, courts cannot substitute their own construction of the statutory provision
for an agency's reasonable construction. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 784 F.2d 959, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1986).
278. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133-37 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
279. For an example of the cost involved, see Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-
502-H, 1999 WL 305108 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir.
2000). In 1999, the anticipated cost of retrofitting, according to Cinemark's plan, was approxi-
mately $15,000 per auditorium, and under the plaintiffs' plan, $22,000 per auditorium. Id.
280. See generally Lara, 207 F.3d 783.
281. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
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ultimate result of the Ninth Circuit decision is that there is no "equal-
ity" of movie-going experiences among wheelchair patrons in the
United States.
A second problem involves the ambiguity as to what these stadium-
style theaters in the Ninth Circuit must do to comply with the ADA.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that viewing angles must be comparable, but
gave no instructions or indications as to how theaters can achieve this
comparability.2 82 The only suggestion offered by the Oregon Para-
lyzed Veterans of America majority is that viewing angles for wheel-
chair patrons must be "within the range of angles offered to the
general public. '2 83 Yet, looking to the plain language of the phrase,
"within the range of angles," offers no more clarification than "lines
of sight comparable" does, and "offered to most of the general public"
is open to various interpretations of what "most" means.284 Such lan-
guage does not further movie theater owners' understanding of what
kind of floorplan is now specifically required for their existing and
future theaters. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit makes no ruling on whether
the decision should be applied retroactively or prospectively. Judge
Kleinfeld's dissent accurately notes that these theater owners are
faced with "impossible uncertainty as what they must do to comply
with the law."' 285 Courts are willing to answer the "must," but no one
seems to want to explain the "how. '286
282. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that the "lines of sight comparable" provision "clearly
require[d] more points of similarity" than just an unobstructed view, and included viewing angles
as one of those points. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 579 (6th Cir. 2003).
In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit avoided having to decide how this could be achieved, and instead
remanded the case back to the district court. Id.
283. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133.
284. Id. at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
285. Id. The Independent Living Resources court stated that "courts are ill-equipped to evalu-
ate such claims and to make what amount to engineering, architectural, and policy determina-
tions as to whether a particular design feature is feasible and desirable." Indep. Living Res. v.
Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 746 (D. Or. 1997). Many attribute this problem to the
ADA's failure to clearly define "readily achievable, the standard by which accommodations are
to be judged." See Carlson, supra note 44, at 905 (footnote and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Without such clarity, "businesses are forced to make their best efforts to comply, not
knowing if their efforts will be 'good enough."' Id. at 905-06 (footnote omitted).
286. It should be noted that in Cinemark USA, Inc., the government came close to addressing
the "how." The attorney for the DOJ told the Sixth Circuit that the DOJ would work with the
defendant theaters "to come up with a reasonable approach." Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d at
582 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The attorney also indicated that the DOJ would be
satisfied by the placement of wheelchair seating in the first row of the stadium section. Id.
However, these comments, though the court assumed the DOJ would stand by them, "come with
'no warranties."' Harris Ominsky, Circuits Split over Wheelchair Seating at Movies, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 12, 2004, at 8.
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Finally, a jurisdictional problem arises. Many of the movie theater
chains facing litigation operate theaters in a variety of different states.
What happens to the theater chain with a place of business incorpo-
rated in California and theaters in Texas? Are the Texas theaters sub-
ject to the Ninth Circuit's decision? This issue was not decided in
either Lara or Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America, however it was
addressed in AMC Entertainment, Inc. and Cinemark USA, Inc.
28 7
In Cinemark USA, Inc., the Sixth Circuit found that the "inconsis-
tent legal obligations" resulting from the circuit split were not "insur-
mountable. '28 8 The AMC court stated that it could rule on AMC's
nationwide compliance with the ADA as long as the court had per-
sonal jurisdiction over AMC. 289 When AMC theaters argued that it
would be subject to conflicting legal obligations from having to com-
ply with both the Ninth and Fifth Circuit decisions, the court rejected
the argument because "[t]he Lara decision imposed no legal obliga-
tion[s]." 290 It would thus appear that any conflict in jurisdiction would
hinge on the personal jurisdiction of the movie theater chain.291 If a
theater chain is subject to the personal jurisdiction of both the Ninth
and Fifth Circuits, the theater chain would be required to adhere to
the more strict Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America decision, which
requires comparable viewing angles. While not "insurmountable,"
theaters would more often than not find themselves having to provide
comparable viewing angles, thereby largely rendering Lara's holding
moot.
B. The Incongruous Definitions of Comparable
The Ninth Circuit's definition of comparable, "within the range of
[viewing] angles offered to the general public, '292 is just another at-
tempt to answer the major issue in dispute: the meaning of section
4.33.3's ambiguous phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for
members of the general public." No clear majority definition has
emerged. 293 Indeed, what "comparability" might require is a difficult
287. See United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d at 584.
288. Cinemark USA, 348 F.3d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted).
289. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133.
293. See James Kurack, Comment, Standing in Front of the Disabled: Judicial Uncertainty over
Enhanced Sightlines in Sports Arenas, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161,183 (2001). Compare Or.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d 1126, with Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th
Cir. 2000).
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question "because of the variety of approaches available, the fact-in-
tensive character of the issue, and the lack of adequate briefing. '294
Courts are split on the issue of whether comparable lines of sight
should necessarily be provided over standing spectators in sports and
entertainment auditoriums. 295 More significantly, courts are also split
on the issue of whether comparability encompasses considerations re-
lating to viewing angle, or whether it should be read to only apply to
considerations relating to level of obstruction.296
It is generally agreed that "comparable" is used in section 4.33.3 in
the sense of "similar" or "equivalent. '297 The question remains, how-
ever, as to what "comparable" means. In interpreting a statute or reg-
ulation, the courts must first look to its plain language.298 The court
must look to the statute or regulation as a whole, and assume that the
promulgating agency intended that each term have meaning.299 Using
this plain language approach, the text of section 4.33.3 provides very
little guidance. Looking to the broader context, it seems that since
"the regulations were intended to provide guidance and it would have
been child's play for the drafters to make clear that the 'lines of sight'
requirement encompassed" both unobstructed views and viewing an-
gles."' 300 However, the drafters did not spell out the requirement as
such, and conflicting interpretations result.30 1
For example, the DOJ uses "comparable" to refer to both unob-
structed views and viewing angles. 30 2 According to the DOJ's inter-
pretation, "wheelchair locations must be provided lines of sight ...
within the range of viewing angles as those offered to most of the
general public in the stadium style seats, adjusted for seat tilt. ' 303 In
its 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Access Board refused to
accept this interpretation outright, 30 4 but partially did so in its 2004
amendment to the ADAAG, where it required comparable viewing
294. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 567 (1st Cir. 2004).
295. See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Centre, 193 F.3d 730 (3d Cir. 1999); Para-
lyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Indep. Living Res. v. Or.
Arena Corp., 982 F.Supp. 698 (D. Or. 1997).
296. See cases cited supra note 9.
297. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citing THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 300 (2d ed. 1982)).
298. Lara, 207 F.3d at 787 (citing United States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 1989)).
299. Id. at 787 (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)).
300. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 566.
301. See cases cited supra note 9.
302. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
303. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. The Access Board said it was "considering whether to include specific requirements in
the final rule that are consistent with the DOJs interpretation of 4.33.3 to stadium-style movie
theaters." 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278 (Nov. 16, 1999).
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angles in all theaters with capacities over 300, while not requiring any
"vertical dispersal" or wheelchair seating in stadium sections of
smaller theaters where the viewing angles are equivalent to "the aver-
age viewing angle provided in the facility. ' 30 5 The Ninth Circuit's
decision validates the DOJ's interpretation. 30 6 Given that the major-
ity of seating in stadium-style movie theaters is in the stadium section
and not the traditional section, the DOJ interpretation essentially re-
quires that wheelchair patrons' views must be as good as those of fifty
percent of the seats.
If "comparable" is used in the sense of "similar" or "equivalent,
30 7
then it would seem that an interpretation that requires viewing angles
that are as good as fifty percent of the seats meets a reasonable defini-
tion of the word.308 Yet, courts have refused to make that specific
finding. 30 9 The regulation is clear in its requirement that lines of sight
be comparable. In evaluating similarity, the question becomes
whether viewing angles should qualify as lines of sight. Undoubtedly,
providing wheelchair patrons with unobstructed views gives them
"comparable" lines of sight and comports with the "equivalent" sense
of the word as it is used.310 All views in stadium-style theaters are
designed to be free of obstructions. 311
Providing viewing angles to wheelchair patrons that are
"equivalent" with those of the general public in the stadium seats is
difficult to achieve. First, section 4.33.3 is not as explicit about view-
ing angles as it is about physical obstructions. 312 Second, patrons'
viewing angles are different depending on the seat they are in. NATO
has also weighed in on the issue and attempted to define "compara-
ble."'313 In 2000, in response to the Access Board's notice, NATO ar-
gued that the "lines of sight comparable" provision of section 4.33.3
does not encompass viewing angles. 314
305. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 565 (internal citations omitted).
306. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133.
307. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2003).
308. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
309. In Cinemark USA, Inc., the court refused to find that wheelchair patrons' viewing angles
must be equivalent to those of fifty percent of the audience, and remanded the case "to deter-
mine what approach might satisfy the viewing-angle requirement." Ominsky, supra note 286, at
8.
310. Most courts agree that "line of sight" can be defined as unobstructed view. Cinemark
USA, 348 F.3d at 575.
311. United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
312. Cinemark USA, 348 F.3d at 576.
313. NATO is a nationwide organization that represents movie theater owners and operators
and actively lobbies on their behalf. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
314. Id. at 1102 (citation omitted).
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However, the Access Board's 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
does indicate that "lines of sight" has a qualitative aspect. 315 The Ac-
cess Board noted that wheelchair patrons are given inferior sightlines
when relegated to the first few rows of a theater's traditional sec-
tion.316 In its 2004 amendment to the ADAAG, the Access Board
included specific requirements that are consistent with the DOJ's in-
terpretation. 317 According to the Access Board, viewing angles must
be "substantially equivalent to or better than those available to all
other spectators" and "equivalent to, or better than, the average view-
ing angle provided in the facility. '31 8 Thus, it appears that section
4.33.3 and the definition of "comparable" does encompass both physi-
cal obstructions and viewing angles. However, until the DOJ revises
its Title III regulations, adopts the Access Board's amended guide-
lines, and makes a viewing angle requirement explicit in the final rule,
the ambiguity of the phrase most likely will be exploited and litigation
will continue to result.319
1. Construing the Ninth Circuit's Decision to Grant Wheelchair
Patrons the Best Seat
Critics of the Ninth Circuit's decision may argue that it effectively
grants wheelchair patrons the "best seat in the house" to the detri-
ment of others.320 Pessimists, may even argue that obtaining this re-
sult is the ulterior motive of wheelchair-users in bringing suit against
stadium-style movie theater chains. These arguments lack sufficient
merit.
The DOJ's interpretation does not require that wheelchair patrons
be given the "best seat in the house." The DOJ's interpretation, as
construed by the government in its litigation efforts and supported by
various courts, including those in the Ninth Circuit, suggests that sec-
315. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d at 577.
316. Id. (citing 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278).
317. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 565 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 44,084, 44,198 (July 23, 2004) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. § 221)).
318. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
319. See McKibbin, supra note 109, at 854 (arguing that lawsuits will persist until the DOJ
revises its regulations); see also Felicia H. Ellsworth, Comment, The Worst Seats in the House:
Stadium Style Movie Theaters and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 U. Cm. L. REV. 1109,
1139 (2004) (arguing that the DOJ should revise its regulations in order to prevent continuing
litigation).
320. In 2001, AMC's Hoffman Center in Alexandria, Virginia provided handicapped seats
that were the "best in the house." Id. (emphasis omitted). These seats were "fully centered,
half-way back, with no one on either side of them and plenty of room for companions." Id.
Stadium seating enhanced everyone's movie-going experience, but those with disabilities bene-
fited the most. Id.
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tion 4.33.3 does not require that wheelchair seating be the best seats in
the house, only that they cannot be the worst.321 Wheelchair patrons
are not seeking the proverbial "best seat," they aie seeking seats as
good as most in the house.
There may be reason to believe the Ninth Circuit's decision pro-
vides wheelchair patrons with more than full and equal enjoyment.
The DOJ's interpretation purports to grant wheelchair patrons view-
ing angles comparable to those of non-disabled patrons in the stadium
section. Since most theaters' stadium sections contain more seats than
those in the traditional section, 322 the DOJ interpretation, which the
Ninth Circuit supports, essentially requires that wheelchair users be
given stadium seats. Such a requirement appears to exceed something
"comparable" and more accurately enters the realm of "favorable."
Under the Ninth Circuit's decision, wheelchair users will automati-
cally get stadium seats no matter what time they arrive to the theater.
Inevitably, wheelchair patrons will be given better seats than some
non-disabled patrons. This could result in the unnecessary broadening
of Title III's purpose to provide "full and equal enjoyment." 323
Wheelchair users deserve an option. They should be given the op-
tion of sitting in the traditional section or the stadium section. Tradi-
tional sections usually have worse sightlines than the stadium sections,
and the Ninth Circuit has a point in worrying that wheelchair patrons
321. AMC Entrm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. Courts have not been forthright in saying the seats
in the front rows and access aisle are the worst seats in the house. However, it has been noted
that the "seats in the middle and rear of the theater offer the best viewing angle, while the seats
in the front offer the worst." United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, 87-88
(D. Mass. 2003), vacated by 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004). Furthermore, wheelchair seating may
be placed in the stadium section's last rows if appropriately accessible and if the viewing angles
there are "not the worst available." Id. at 88.
322. In Cinemark's theaters, the stadium section contained over eighty percent of the thea-
ter's general seating. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2003).
Roughly seventy percent of its patrons sit in tle stadium section. See Ominsky, supra note 286,
at 8.
323. Congress's stated purpose in enacting the ADA was twofold: (1) "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;" and (2) "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (2000). See also
Comment, supra note 69, at 729. The Ninth Circuit's decision may have satisfied disability rights
advocates, but "its sightlines interpretation is problematic and fails to recognize important social
goals of the ADA," like integration. Id. at 730. The court's sightlines interpretation comports
with the plain meaning of section 4.33.3 but it "cannot 'be translated into a floorplan,"' and it is
"difficult to imagine a holding that could match the exacting specificity of other ADA regula-
tions." Id. (quoting Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126,
1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)).
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would be subject to a "wheelchair ghetto" if denied a choice in
seating. 324
On the other hand, the "wheelchair ghetto" worries seem a bit irra-
tional for larger theaters considering that wheelchair patrons are al-
ready protected by section 4.33.3's requirement that wheelchair spaces
be placed in more than one location when a theater's seating capacity
exceeds three hundred. Each location must be an "integral part" of
the seating arrangement and provide the required comparable lines of
sight.325 This requirement eliminates the possibility of a "wheelchair
ghetto" in theaters with capacities over three hundred, 326 but it does
nothing to ensure that wheelchair patrons have a choice.
2. Preferences Play a Large Role in Determining Whether a
Particular Viewing Angle Is "Comparable"
Wheelchair seating must include "lines of sight comparable to those
for members of the general public. ' 327 When wheelchair patrons are
seated in the traditional section or access aisle near or next to other
non-disabled patrons, they are seated among the general public.
Yet, wheelchair users argue that since a majority of patrons usually
only go to traditional seats in the front of the theater when the sta-
dium section is full, they are deprived of "lines of sight comparable to
those of the general public. ' 328 Section 4.33.3 on its face, however,
makes no mention of requiring "lines of sight comparable" to a major-
ity of the general public.3 29 Movie theater patrons may have a ten-
dency to sit in the middle or rear of the stadium section, but this
tendency is not conclusive. Every seat in a movie theater, in the tradi-
tional or the stadium section, has a different viewing angle, either hor-
izontally or vertically or both.330 While "many (perhaps most)
324. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
325. Id.
326. Indeed, Judge Kleinfeld called the concern "a chimera .... Under the existing regula-
tions, there cannot be a wheelchair ghetto out of the way, behind a post, or off to the side." Or.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
327. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
328. The plaintiff in Hoyts Cinemas Corp. relied on an expert's report and a "study" consist-
ing of videos of movie-going audiences choosing their seats. The court found: "Even in a wholly
traditional theater, as anyone who has ever been to the movies knows, patrons typically tend to
avoid the front rows of a theater until all the middle and back rows are filled, and most audi-
ences initially congregate in the middle seats." United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 73, 81 (D. Mass. 2003), vacated by 380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004).
329. The DOJ interpretation of section 4.33.3 does require, however, that wheelchair loca-
tions be given "lines of sight comparable" to those offered to "most" of the general public. Or.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1130.
330. "As a matter of geometry a line of sight will not be identical to any particular other seat."
Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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patrons, in many (perhaps most) theaters, might prefer seating in the
stadium section... it is hardly obvious that this would be true in every
stadium theater regardless of configuration.
331
People's preferences are highly subjective and "unusual,"332 and
can easily differ from one person to the next. This is relevant consid-
ering the fact that viewing angles are different from every seat in the
house. Some people like to sit in the very back of the theater to enjoy
a sense of separation. Some people like to sit in the very front row
just to be as close to the screen as they can and be completely sur-
rounded by the images. Some like to sit at the end of the aisles be-
cause their legs get cramped during a lengthy movie, or they are
expecting an important cell phone call. Indeed, in United States v.
Hoyts Cinemas Corp., the First Circuit recognized "evidence that
viewers in particular theaters found some seats in the [traditional sec-
tion] or in the access aisle equally attractive to some seats in the sta-
dium, and that in others wheelchair spaces in the slope had quite good
angles. 333
Judge Kleinfeld, in his dissent, said there was no legitimate way the
lines of sight, as applied to viewing angles, could be "comparable" to
all of the aforementioned preferences. 334 Lines of sight cannot be
comparable to such subjective preferences, "without requiring the
scattering of wheelchair seating that the 300-seat provision [of section
4.33.3] expressly avoids requiring in smaller theaters." 335 There also
remains the question of whether the viewing experience one has in a
wheelchair, no matter the location, can ever be "comparable" to the
viewing experience one has outside of a wheelchair.
336
For those members of the general public who prefer to sit in the
traditional section near the front of the theater, wheelchair patrons do
share a "comparable" line of sight. 337 Furthermore, theaters do not
331. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 571 (1st Cir. 2004).
332. Id. at 567.
333. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 571.
334. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1126 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
335. Id.
336. In ruling against AMC, the judge cited one patron "who complained of 'severe neck and
eye strain' after watching a particular movie." Jonathan V. Last, ADA Goes to the Movies, THE
WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 24, 2003, at 2, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content[Public/Arti-
cles/000/000/002/152ynehd.asp. This patron used a joystick-controlled wheelchair and had to
read lips to overcome a hearing impairment. Id. (the court posed the question, "How ... could
AMC ever have provided this woman 'a movie-going experience comparable to that of other
patrons?").
337. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 570. There was evidence that some viewers found seats in the
traditional section or access aisle "equally attractive" to those seats in the stadium section. Id. at
571.
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charge patrons any differently for the seat they choose. Whether one
decides to sit in the dead center of the stadium section where he or
she believes the viewing angle is the best or the sound is optimal,338 or
whether one sits in the very front row of the theater, where the screen
almost threatens to eat him or her alive, there is no difference in ticket
price.339 Since theaters do not charge more or less to sit in front, in
back, or in the center, seating in the front cannot be considered unde-
sirable per se.340
The subjective analysis that goes into one moviegoer's preference
for a certain viewing angle makes it almost impossible to reach a uni-
form consensus on what lines of sight are "comparable" to the general
public. 341 In Cinemark USA, Inc., the court refused to make a finding
that the viewing angle had to be equivalent to that of fifty percent of
the theater patrons.342 Thus, it is challenging to give effect to the
DOJ's interpretation that section 4.33.3 requires the language of
"lines of sight comparable" to apply to most movie patrons' viewing
angles when the regulation itself only requires "lines of sight compara-
ble" to those of the general public. Furthermore, wheelchair seating
in stadium sections need not be provided in every theater. The First
Circuit stated that "narrower angles are surely better, in any meaning-
ful sense, only up to a point. '343 Evidence suggests a comfortable ver-
tical viewing angle ranges from thirty to thirty-five degrees or less;
where this comfort is provided in traditional sections, theaters "argua-
bly provide comfort 'comparable' to stadium seats even if the [tradi-
tional section seats] [have] flatter angles. ' 344
C. Is the DOJ's Interpretation Entitled to Deference?
Another issue raised in Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America, and
many other cases addressing the same litigated subject matter, is
whether it is unreasonable for the DOJ to interpret "lines of sight
comparable" to include both physical obstructions and viewing an-
338. One commentator has stated that the best place to sit in terms of the optimal sound
experience is "about two thirds of the distance from the screen to the back of the theater." Jeff
Tyson, How Movie Screens Work, at http://stuffo.howstuffworks.com/movie-screen2.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2005).
339. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
340. See id.
341. Imposing a viewing angle requirement requires district courts to "interpret the ADA
based upon the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of disabled moviegoers." Lara
v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2000).
342. See Ominsky, supra note 286, at 8.
343. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 571.
344. Id.
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gles. 345 It is generally recognized that courts must defer to the inter-
pretation of a regulation by the agency charged with enforcing that
regulation unless that agency's interpretation is "'plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with' the regulation. ' 346 But if the meaning of the regula-
tory language is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation of the regula-
tion only controls if it is reasonable.
347
Whether an agency's interpretation is a "fair and considered judg-
ment" depends on whether it is inconsistent with the regulation itself
or with the agency's previous positions. 348 At first glance, it would
appear that the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3, as it pertains to
viewing angles, is inconsistent with previous positions. Looking to the
legislative record for guidance on the "integral part" requirement of
section 4.33.3, the DOJ's Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimina-
tion on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities "explained integration of wheelchairs not in
terms of having viewing angles better than 50% of the seats in an as-
sembly area, but in terms of wheelchair patrons being able to sit near
family and friends." 349 The Ninth Circuit did not address the inconsis-
tency with the regulation or with the DOJ's previous positions.
350 It
jumped straight to the reasonableness analysis. Thus, there is no in-
consistency to the DOJ's interpretation.
The regulatory language of section 4.33.3 is ambiguous, however,
and the DOJ's interpretation must be reasonable to be entitled to def-
erence.35' Moreover, "[d]eference to the agency's view does not mean
abdication. '352 Two additional issues arise under the reasonableness
determination: (1) whether the "viewing angle" scenario was expressly
anticipated at the time the regulation issued; and (2) whether section
4.33.3 is the DOJ's regulation or the Access Board's regulation.
345. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1132.
346. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, 89 (D. Mass. 2003), vacated by
380 F.3d 558 (tst Cir. 2004) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
347. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1131 (citing Lal v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 255 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)).
348. United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
349. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. 1-99-CV-705, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24418, at
*22-23 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2001).
350. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1132.
351. Id.
352. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 569 (1st Cir. 2004).
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1. Whether the "Viewing Angle" Scenario Was Expressly
Anticipated at the Time the Regulation Was Issued
The "viewing angle" scenario was considered in Lara, where the
Fifth Circuit held the DOJ interpretation was unreasonable because
questions of "viewing angle" did not arise until after the DOJ issued
section 4.33.3.353 It also cited the lack of evidence indicating the Ac-
cess Board's intent to have section 4.33.3 apply to viewing angles and
the Access Board's 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in which the
Board stated it had not yet decided whether to adopt the DOJ's posi-
tion.354 Both the Fifth Circuit in Lara and Judge Kleinfeld's dissent in
Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America refer to other existing regula-
tions at the time of promulgation in order to breathe meaning into the
ambiguous language. The Fifth Circuit said the phrase "lines of sight"
meant unobstructed view when used in other contexts.35 5 Judge
Kleinfeld's dissent mentioned the "great precision" with which the
"accessibility guidelines" surrounding section 4.33.3 were written. 356
Thus, because viewing angles were not expressly anticipated when sec-
tion 4.33.3 was issued, it can be argued that courts should not defer to
the DOJ's interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit declined to accept this reasoning.357 It agreed
that stadium-style theaters were not in existence when section 4.33.3
was passed,358 but it said the DOJ's failure to consider the question of
"viewing angles" in stadium-style theaters at the time of promulgation
was "not dispositive. '' 359 The Ninth Circuit said that a broadly drafted
regulation, with a broad purpose, can be applied to a "particular fac-
tual scenario not expressly anticipated at the time the regulation was
promulgated. '360 Given the fact that the Supreme Court recently ap-
peared to favor administrative interpretations over the usual rules of
353. Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2000). The court referenced the
DOJ's 1994 Technical Assistance Manual as evidence. Id. The 1994 DOJ Manual explicitly re-
quired views over standing spectators, but did not address the issue of viewing angles. Id.
354. Id. at 789. See 64 Fed. Reg. 60,848, 62,278 (Nov. 16, 1999).
355. See Lara, 207 F.3d at 788-89; supra note 135 and accompanying text.
356. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). For example,
telephone cord length must be at least twenty-nine inches (735 mm). Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36
app A., § 4.31.8 (2003)). Knee clearance at tables and counters for those in wheelchair seating
must be at least twenty-seven inches high (685 mm), thirty inches wide (760 mm), and nineteen
inches deep (485 mm). 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, app. a, § 4.32.3 (2003). As Judge Kleinfeld stated,
"Where a regulation tells movie architects and owners to the millimeter how they must construct
knee space, the use of the vague term 'comparable' must be looser by intent." Or. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1135 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
357. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1132.
358. Lara, 207 F.3d at 788.
359. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1132-33.
360. Id. (citing Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)).
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statutory construction and the plain meaning doctrine, it seems the
Ninth Circuit has the stronger position on the "expressly anticipated
at the time of promulgation" argument.
361
2. Whose Regulation Is It?
The second issue arising under the reasonableness determination is
whether section 4.33.3 is the DOJ's regulation or the Access Board's
regulation. This issue was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Ore-
gon Paralyzed Veterans of America. In other cases however, movie
theater owners have argued that the DOJ's interpretation is "not wor-
thy of deference because [section] 4.33.3 is not the DOJ's regula-
tion. ' 362 The Access Board, they argue, was the agency that actually
drafted the regulation, albeit as a proposed guideline. 363 Thus, the
Access Board controlled the language of both the guidelines and the
regulation.364 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected this argument, saying that once the Access
Board's proposed guidelines were released by the DOJ as its own reg-
ulation, it became the DOJ's responsibility.
365
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed
with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion. 366 The Third Circuit held that the
DOJ "implicitly adopted" the Access Board's analysis of section
4.33.3 based on these five factors:
1) the DOJ referred all comments to the [Access] Board; 2) the
DOJ relied on the [Access] Board to make adequate changes based
on those comments; 3) the [Access] Board specifically changed the
language of [section] 4.33.3 in response to comments and explained
[the] change in its commentary; 4) the DOJ was a "member of the
Board" and "participated actively ... in preparation of both the
proposed and final versions of the [guidelines];" and 5) the DOJ's
361. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that while administrative interpretations are "'not prod-
ucts of formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect in closing the door on any sugges-
tion that the usual rules of statutory construction should get short shrift for the sake of reading
'other legal process' in abstract breadth."' Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133 n.9
(quoting Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S.
371 (2003)).
362. United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
363. Id.
364. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
365. Id. Deference is based on an agency's role as the regulation's sponsor and not on the
agency's drafting expertise. Id. The court recognized that the DOJ had "no administrative adju-
dicatory authority ... to interpret its regulation," but nevertheless held that Congress delegated
to the DOJ "the authority to flesh out the statutory framework by issuance of its regulations."
Id. Thus, the DOJ has a legal and policymaking authority that equates with "the adjudicatory
authority of other statutory schemes." Id. The United States District Court for the Central
District of California followed this reasoning. See AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
366. See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730. 736 (3d Cir. 1999).
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commentary stated that the final guidelines promulgated by the
Board adequately addressed all comments. 367
In addition, one of the conventional reasons for deference is exper-
tise. 368 Because the Access Board is the congressionally appointed ex-
pert behind the ADAAG, this justifies giving "some weight to the
views of the Board itself. ' 369 Thus, section 4.33.3 is fundamentally the
Access Board's regulation even though the DOJ has assumed respon-
sibility for it. Consequently, any reasonable interpretation of section
4.33.3 would seem to take into account the Access Board's views, and
deference should not be given to the DOJ's interpretation unless it
comports with the Access Board's views.
Even when courts have rejected the argument that section 4.33.3 is
the Access Board's regulation, they have cited the Access Board's
comments and its 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking as support for
the conclusions that "viewing angles" apply and the DOJ's interpreta-
tion is reasonable. 370 For example, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California rejected the argument that the
DOJ's interpretation was not entitled to deference because it was not
the DOJ's regulation.371 In holding that "line of sight" refers both to
physical obstructions and viewing angles, the court "recognize[d] the
importance of the language in the Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing."' 372 In another, more recent example, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit stated that the Access Board's 2004
amendment to the ADAAG was "helpful" and went "a long way to
determining for the future the extremely difficult question of how
much 'comparability' is required for new construction. ' 373 Thus, sec-
tion 4.33.3 can legitimately be construed to be the regulation of both
the Access Board and the DOJ.374 While Congress charged the DOJ
with the responsibility of adopting regulations to implement Title III
of the ADA, it also charged the Access Board with "'establish[ing]
367. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Third Circuit did not accept the DOJ's interpretation.
Id. at 737.
368. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 567 (1st Cir. 2004).
369. Id.
370. Excluding Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000), see cases cited supra
note 9.
371. AMC Entm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
372. Id. at 1110-11.
373. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 575.
374. This seems to satisfy the posture articulated in Colby v. J.C. Penney Co. In Colby, the
Seventh Circuit stated, "A posture somewhere in between some deference and complete defer-
ence is proper when cases in different circuits challenge the same practice of the same defen-
dant." Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1987).
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and maintain[ing] minimum guidelines and requirements for the stan-
dards issued pursuant to' Title 111. 375
D. Access Board's Recognition of the Problem
In its 1999 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Access Board di-
rectly addressed the DOJ's interpretation, and the issue of "viewing
angles" in stadium-style theaters with respect to the requirements of
section 4.33.3.376 When the Access Board issued its proposed guide-
lines in July of 1991, the DOJ promulgated section 4.33.3 on the very
same day, and worded it identically to the Access Board's guide-
lines. 377 Since the Access Board was the original drafter of the regula-
tion, it presumably has superior knowledge as to what was intended
by the language.
In July 2004, the Access Board finally issued an amendment to the
ADAAG. 378 The amendment "requires that in assembly areas of
more than 300 seats, wheelchair spaces shall be dispersed and shall
provide wheelchair users a choice 'of seating locations and viewing
angles that are substantially equivalent to, or better than,' those 'avail-
able to all other spectators.'1,379 No vertical dispersal is required in
smaller theaters, however, where the wheelchair seating provides
viewing angles "'equivalent to, or better than, the average viewing an-
gle provided in the facility." 380 The Board recognized that although
most stadium-style theaters offer sight lines to the screen that are gen-
erally superior to those in traditional-style theaters, not all traditional
sections of stadium-style theaters lack viewing angle equivalence.381
The Access Board realized that smaller stadium-style theaters,
those with capacities less than three hundred, posed a problem for
wheelchair patrons, 382 but it did not rule that wheelchair locations in
stadium seating are always required. Although the Access Board
agrees with the DOJ that section 4.33.3 encompasses viewing angles, it
does a better job of balancing the competing interests. On one hand,
it is desirable to afford wheelchair patrons improved sight lines. On
375. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1129 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 792(b)(3)(B) (2000)).
376. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 62,278 (Nov. 16, 1999).
377. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730. 734-35 (3d Cir. 1999).
378. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 565.
379. Id. (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,198).
380. Id. (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,199).
381. Id.
382. When dispersion of wheelchair spaces is not required, for example, in smaller stadium-
style theaters, "the placement of wheelchair spaces in relation to other seating acquires greater
significance because wheelchair users are not offered a choice of viewing angles." 64 Fed. Reg.
at 62,278.
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the other hand, there is the concern of design professionals, who
"have expressed some uncertainty about how to measure their compli-
ance. '383 Where a theater's traditional section offers equivalent view-
ing angles to those in the stadium section, there is no need to place
wheelchair locations in the stadium section.384 Thus, there is merit to
the argument that the DOJ's proposed applicability of section 4.33.3
(requiring that wheelchair locations always be provided in stadiums
sections) is not embodied in the Access Board's amendment to its
guidelines.385
The DOJ's interpretation matters most to the courts. 386 But the
DOJ's interpretation, as it stands, offers vague guidance to design pro-
fessionals, architects, and movie theater owners as to how they must
comply with the "viewing angle" requirement. It is one thing to re-
quire wheelchair locations with viewing angles within the range of
fifty percent of the house; it is another thing to actually achieve it.387
With the Ninth Circuit's decision to defer to the DOJ interpretation,
movie theaters merely know that they are in violation of the ADA
and must somehow correct that.
In promulgating section 4.33.3, "the DOJ implicitly adopted the Ac-
cess Board's analysis. ' 388 Why not involve the Access Board and its
amended guidelines in refashioning section 4.33.3 or adopting a new
regulation now? 389 Then, the ADA compliance requirements will be
"clear, precise and prospective... [and] ... obtained after a fair pro-
cess."' 390 Architects will know how they must design a movie theater
before building it, and owners of existing theaters will know what
types of reconstruction to perform. The First Circuit stated that it
would not be difficult to develop a mechanical standard of compara-
bility and apply it to the viewing angles in individual movie thea-
383. Id. at 62,277.
384. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 565 (citing 69 Fed. Reg. at 44,198).
385. See McKibbin, supra note 109, at 853 (stating that the Board's amendment seemed to
"give credence to the position that the DOJ's litigating position was not supported by the old
ADAAG requirements"). The Ninth Circuit did not address the Access Board's role in the
litigation at hand, but Judge Kleinfeld's dissent did. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d
at 1133-37 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
386. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
387. This may explain why the Sixth Circuit was so reluctant and unwilling to make a finding
that the viewing angles must be equivalent to those of fifty percent of theater patrons.
388. Caruso, 193 F.3d at 736; see supra note 377 and accompanying text.
389. The DOJ appears to be considering this. In January 2005, it plans to start revising its
Title III regulations and adopting the Access Board's amended guidelines. Hoyts Cinema., 380
F.3d at 565 n.6 (citing Unified Agenda, 69 Fed. Reg. 37,734, 37,749 (June 28, 2004)).
390. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Access Board process should be left alone).
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ters.391 More importantly, doing so will help guide the lower courts in
determining the extent of the viewing angle requirement.
392
Instead of simply offering an interpretation, the DOJ should use
one of the following two options. First, it could amend section 4.33.3.
The First Circuit stated that where "the interpretation has the practi-
cal effect of altering the regulation, a formal amendment-almost cer-
tainly prospective and after notice and comment-is the proper
course. ' 393 The second option would be to get rid of section 4.33.3
and pass a new rule.394 In its amended guidelines, the Access Board
"deleted section 4.33.3 entirely" and created a section 221.2.3 in-
stead.395 Further, the DOJ's "proffered interpretation ha[s] received
short shrift in the courts. '396 The First Circuit singled out the DOJ's
shortcomings and stated that "[t]here is no doubt that [section] 4.33.3
is vague as to whether it embraces angles" and "that the [DOJ] has
been slow in providing more precise guidance by regulation. ' 397 The
DOJ first publicly adopted its current interpretation of section 4.33.3
in 1998. 398 No new rule has passed since then, despite the fact that
stadium seating in movie theaters has existed for nine years now, and
the DOJ has been well aware that it has to make its regulations
clearer. 399 The DOJ should work together with the Access Board and
utilize its rulemaking capacity, instead of bringing lawsuits against the-
ater chains.400
391. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 572.
392. The Ninth Circuit remanded and instructed the district court to grant the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for summary judgment. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133. The Sixth Circuit
remanded to determine exactly how similar lines of sight had to be for wheelchair patrons.
United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 579 (6th Cir. 2003). The First Circuit felt
"compelled" to remand. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 575.
393. Id. at 569 (footnote omitted).
394. This is within the DOJ's discretion because if the DOJ has the option to choose whether
to proceed by general rule or individual ad hoc litigation it can also likely proceed by amending
the general rule. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d at 580.
395. McKibbin, supra note 109, at 850.
396. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 73, 92 (D. Mass. 2003), vacated by
380 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 2004).
397. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 573.
398. Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 92.
399. Id.
400. See Ellsworth, supra note 319, at 1123, 1137-39 (arguing that the DOJ should clarify
section 4.33.3 through "notice and comment rulemaking"); McKibbin, supra note 109, at 854
(arguing that wheelchair patrons will not have better sightlines until the DOJ implements new
regulations).
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E. The Dangers of Retroactive Regulations
The Ninth Circuit's decision leaves the door open for the "viewing
angle" requirement to be applied retroactively to existing movie thea-
ters. Due process, however, requires that enactments be clear enough
to give movie theaters "fair warning of what is prohibited. '40 ' By de-
ferring to the DOJ's interpretation, the Ninth Circuit risks leaving ar-
chitects and theater owners in a state of confusion.40 2 If retroactively
applied, thousands of movie theater owners "will discover that they
are out of compliance with the law, and must [now] destroy facilities
built in compliance with the law according to the best knowledge of
design professionals at the time. '40 3 In other words, the DOJ is
presenting a new interpretation of section 4.33.3 by invalidating prior
approvals given under DOJ-certified compliance regulations at the
time.404
Theaters argue that the "lines of sight comparable" provision of sec-
tion 4.33.3 is too vague to provide them with the fair warning required
by due process, and thus, the government should be estopped from
arguing the DOJ's interpretation.40 5 The DOJ argues that it has only
advocated an interpretation of the ambiguous term "comparable. '40 6
However, in construction, theaters have often relied on approvals
under state compliance codes, which the DOJ has certified as "meet-
ing or exceeding" the ADA's requirements. 40 7 The fact that theaters
may have known their wheelchair seating locations provided unfavor-
able viewing angles is not dispositive because the ADA requires com-
parability, not quality.40 8 The First Circuit even stated that theaters
could, "from a narrow standpoint," argue that the federal government
did not give them notice of its current interpretation until 1998.409
Furthermore, one scholarly treatise states that "[a]n agency is not al-
401. United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972)).
402. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
403. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
404. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 580-83 (6th Cir. 2003).
405. The Sixth Circuit stated that "[d]ue process concerns may warrant denial of enforcement
of an agency determination when conduct previously approved by a regulatory agency is retroac-
tively branded as statutory violation." Id. at 581.
406. The United States District Court for the Central District of California found that the lack
of conflicting interpretations coupled with the reasonableness of the DOJ's interpretation led to
no violation of due process. AMC Entrm't, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. The court ruled that AMC
should have understood that section 4.33.3 required comparable viewing angles for wheelchair
patrons in stadium-style theaters. Id.
407. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d at 581 (internal quotation marks omitted).
408. See Ellsworth, supra note 319, at 1133-34.
409. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 573 (1st Cir. 2004).
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lowed to change a legislative rule retroactively through the process of
disingenuous interpretation of the rule to mean something other than
it- original meaning." 410
Such retroactive applications of the rule risk violating the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA). 411 Without the assurance of proper no-
tice the Act gives, retroactive application has the potential to punish
theater owners who have incurred the enormous expense of designing
and constructing movie theaters under the false impression that they
were in compliance with the requirements of the ADA, and specifi-
cally, section 4.33.3. In Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America, defen-
dant Regal Cinemas alleged that all six of its theaters in question were
inspected and complied with the applicable local regulations of the
time.412 If Regal relied on such approvals, that fact would appear to
support an APA estoppel argument. 41 3
Yet, neither the Ninth nor the Sixth Circuit has held that a due pro-
cess violation occurred under the APA.414 Even if no due process vio-
lation is found, the Ninth Circuit should follow the Sixth Circuit's lead
and consider granting prospective relief.415 On remand, the district
court should be able to consider the prior advice and representations
reasonably relied on by the theaters.416 On the other hand, if the DOJ
decides to formally amend section 4.33.3, that amendment should also
govern prospectively. 417
410. Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Centre, 193 F.3d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at
283 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
411. The APA prevents new rules of law from being adopted without giving proper notice.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (2000).
412. Appellees' Brief at 5, Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. (No. 01-135554), available at 2002
WL 32154039. The approvals "repeatedly confirmed Regal's compliance with the Oregon Uni-
form Building Code," which contained requirements similar to section 4.33.3. Id. In addition,
Regal's movie theaters complied with the ADAAG requirements. including "placement, width,
height, and depth of doorways, aisleway and ramp access, toilets, telephones, water fountains,
emergency equipment, ticket and concession counters, audio enhancements, parking, outside
access," and many more. Id. at 7.
413. See United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. 1:99-CV-705, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24418
at *17 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2001).
414. For the Sixth Cicuit's decision, see Cinemark USA, 348 F.3d at 580-83. The Ninth Circuit
decision does not even address the issue of due process under the APA.
415. The Sixth Circuit held that Cinemark's reliance on the Texas Accessibility Standards and
"the government's statements with respect to the state building code certification process
weigh[ed] strongly in favor of" granting prospective relief. Cinemark USA, 348 F.3d at 581. The
court does not say that relief must be prospective, only that it will usually be appropriate given
these facts. Id.
416. Cinemark USA, 348 F.3d at 582. Reliance on state or local ordinances constitutes rebut-
table, not incontrovertible, evidence. Id. at 581-82. The presumption favoring the builder may
be overcome. Id. at 582.
417. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 569 (1st Cir. 2004).
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The First Circuit held that retroactive application is unfair depend-
ing on the obligations "ultimately imposed" on the theaters, 418 and
retrofitting an existing facility to new requirements presents numerous
challenges that can be construed as unfair. For instance, retrofitting a
theater costs much more than designing a new theater.419 And in ex-
isting theaters, it is more difficult to insert new constructions into the
existing infrastructure, "especially in a steel-frame building. '420 In re-
trofitting, "[e]ven the minutest change (e.g., laying electrical lines)
might entail the complete revamping of the entire theater. '42 1 Thus,
even though the Ninth Circuit's decision may be applied retroactively,
the dangers are too great, and the "viewing angle" requirement should
only be imposed on new theaters constructed or refurbished within
the Ninth Circuit.
V. IMPACT
This section discusses the likely impact of the decision in Oregon
Paralyzed Veterans of America. It begins with a discussion on how the
law will develop from this opinion, including the effect on movie thea-
ter owners, architects, and theater patrons in the impacted states. It
next reviews the various proposed solutions to the imposed viewing
angle requirement in stadium-style theaters. Finally, this section pro-
poses a resolution to apply the Ninth Circuit decision prospectively
and wait for the DOJ and Access Board to revise section 4.33.3 or
adopt a new regulation before imposing a viewing angle requirement
on existing theaters.
A. How Will the Law Develop after Oregon Paralyzed
Veterans of America?
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of
America will have an extensive effect on how Title III of the ADA is
418. Id. at 574.
419. David W. Dunlap, Architecture in the Age of Accessibility, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1997, § 9,
at 4 (quoting John L. Wodatch, chief of the DOJ's disability rights section). Dunlap calls re-
trofitting a "difficult business." Id.
420. Id. (quoting William B. Tabler, Jr.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The difficulty
derives from retrofitting what may not necessarily be "readily achievable." Title III of the ADA
provides that discrimination includes: "(iv) a failure to remove architectural barriers and com-
munication barriers that are structural in nature ... in existing facilities ... where such removal
is readily achievable." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2000) (emphasis added). The Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) defines "readily achievable" as easily achievable, with little difficulty
or expense. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2003). The CFR also sets out several factors that determine
whether an action is "readily achievable." Those factors include: (1) nature and cost of the
action needed; (2) overall financial resources of the site involved; and (3) overall financial re-
sources and size of any parent corporation (if applicable). Id.
421. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 574.
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construed in the future. Since the Supreme Court refused to hear Re-
gal's appeal,422 the decision currently applies to nine Western states.
423
Theater owners in these states are now "vulnerable to challenges.
424
The whole Ninth Circuit is "ripe for new lawsuits. ' 425 The decision is
ambiguous regarding whether section 4.33.3's viewing angle require-
ment will be applied retroactively, but some have speculated that
strict compliance will only be required in new theaters.
42 6
Retroactive application is entirely possible, if not probable, given
the ambiguity in the Ninth Circuit's decision, resulting in costly con-
struction and possibly, refurbishment of existing theaters. 427 Assum-
ing a retroactive application of the holding, existing movie theaters
within the Ninth Circuit will have to provide stadium seating, with
"comparable" viewing angles, to wheelchair patrons in order to com-
ply with the newly interpreted requirements of section 4.33.3.428 Indi-
vidual movie theaters with capacities of three hundred or more,
however, will probably escape any construction or refurbishment be-
cause they are already required to disperse wheelchair seating and
place seats in the stadium section.429 Thus, any required construction
or refurbishment will most prominently impact smaller movie thea-
ters. As many as 18,000 theaters nationwide now face possible altera-
tions in their seating. 430
These movie theaters already have to meet other wheelchair area
requirements that are connected and give context to the "lines of sight
comparable" provision. 431 Wheelchair seating areas must "adjoin an
422. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d 1126, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2903 (2004).
423. The Ninth Circuit's reach includes all stadium-style theatres in California, Oregon, Wash-
ington, Arizona, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands. See United States Court for the Ninth Circuit, at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2005).
424. Beyond the Letter of the ADA, THE OREGONIAN, July 3, 2004, at D6.
425. Ashbel S. Green, Movie-Theater Decision Supports Lawsuit Brought by 3 Disabled Ore-
gon Residents, THE OREGONIAN, July 1, 2004, at C1 (quoting Kathleen L. Wilde, legal director of
the Oregon Advocacy Center) (internal quotation marks omitted).
426. Bob Egelko, Wheelchair Users Win Court Ruling; Theaters Must Offer Equal Seating, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 14, 2003, at A17.
427. Indeed, one of the attorneys involved in the case agreed with Judge Kleinfeld that retro-
active application of the rule will be required. See Watson, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting Kathleen
L. Wilde, of the Oregon Advocacy Center in Portland). Kathleen L. Wilde, who represented the
plaintiffs, said the Ninth Circuit's decision "means retrofit." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
428. See Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d 1126.
429. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
430. Chris Cobbs, Battle over Movie Seating May Be Settled, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 29,
2004, at C1.
431. The key features of accessible stadiums are as follows: at least one percent of the seating
must be wheelchair seating locations, with each location being an open, level space capable of
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accessible route," be an integral part of the fixed seating plan, and be
adjacent to companion seating.432 These three wheelchair area re-
quirements could complicate the construction and refurbishment pro-
cess because they must coexist with the viewing angle requirement.
For some theaters, this may prove to be structurally impractical. 433 If
so, it is possible that failure to adhere to section 4.33.3 will be ex-
cused.434 The combination of all these requirements will inevitably
lead to a new, and perhaps different design for the stadium section.
At this point, it is unclear if a new and different design for stadium
sections will provide the same advantages to non-disabled patrons that
the current design does.435 After all, "[d]esigning a theater that meets
every rule is no small trick. '436
Another possible result of the Ninth Circuit's decision is a waste of
time, effort, and money.437 The court gives no indication as to what
may be the least expensive design. The only instruction it gives movie
theaters is "to require a viewing angle for wheelchair seating within
the range of angles offered to the general public. '438 There is a possi-
bility that movie theaters will spend substantial amounts of money, 439
time, and resources in trying to comply with the ADA, without any
guarantee that the constructions or refurbishments they perform will,
accommodating one person and having a smooth, stable, and slip-resistant surface. 28 C.F.R. pt.
36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003). Accessible seating must be an integral part of the seating plan in
order to prevent wheelchair patrons from being isolated from others. Id. Companion seats must
be provided next to each wheelchair seat, and wheelchair seating locations must be on an acces-
sible route that provides access from parking and transportation areas and connects to all public
areas. Id. An online version of these requirements is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/
stadium.txt (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
432. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
433. See supra notes 420-421 and accompanying text.
434. The only way a public accommodation can "justify its failure to provide access" in accor-
dance with the requirements of the ADAAG "is by showing structural impracticability." Caruso
v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730, 740 (3d Cir. 1999).
435. For a sample of the current stadium design's advantages, see supra notes 39-42 and ac-
companying text.
436. Beyond the Letter of the ADA, THE OREGONIAN, July 3, 2004, at D6.
437. In Lara, the district court made it quite clear that it was aware of the costs of retrofitting
an existing stadium-style movie theater when it required all eighteen of Cinemark's theaters to
be retrofitted. See Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., No. EP-97-CA-502-H, 1999 WL 305108, at *2
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000). Retrofitting
requires each theater auditorium to shut down during the process. Id. This results in "some
permanent loss of seating capacity," which in turn leads to a potential loss in revenue. Id. For
an example of estimated costs of retrofitting, see supra note 279.
438. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1133 (emphasis added).
439. AMC Theaters may spend up to twenty-one million dollars on the retrofitting of twelve
stadium-style theaters in order to bring them into compliance with the viewing angle require-
ment. AMC Settlement Severs Line-of-Sight from Barrier Issue, 27 DISABILITY COMPLIANCE
BULLETIN (Jan. 23, 2004).
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in fact, bring them into compliance. 440 The Ninth Circuit's ruling
could mean that thousands of movie theaters "must now be destroyed
or expensively retrofitted. '44' The government contends that it is be-
ing reasonable. Indeed, at oral argument in Cinemark USA, Inc., the
attorney from the DOJ said, "I want to make very clear to the court,
we have emphasized repeatedly the United States is not-has not and
is not going to argue, for example, that the entire interior of the thea-
ter be gutted or torn down.
442
Nevertheless, renovations of some sort will inevitably result.
443
With theaters spending millions on renovations and suffering devas-
tating costs in return,444 moviegoers themselves could also be ad-
versely impacted. In a brief in support of Regal's appeal of the Ninth
Circuit decision, NATO stated that "refitting movie theaters probably
would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. ' 445 The exhibition indus-
try already has its share of costly repairs. Older, traditional slanted-
floor theaters are being converted into theaters with stadium seating
for a price of $75,000-$100,000 per screen.446 Sloped-floor theaters
are now considered an obsolete asset, when they practically could
have been "viable for another decade. ' 447 From 1996 to 1999, the five
major theater chains spent more than $4 billion building new stadium-
style theaters in order to keep up with the popular trend.448 Mean-
while, the cost of general operations is increasing. Movie theaters
spend roughly $4,200 a week on the operational costs associated with
showing a film, such as keeping lights turned on and video games run-
ning, and as the minimum wage continues to rise, so do the payroll
440. See Ellsworth, supra note 319, at 1137 (arguing that clarifying the meaning of section
4.33.3 "would save a great deal of time, money, and judicial resources").
441. Laurie Asseo, High Court Interested in Theater's ADA Case, THE DENVER POST (Jan. 13,
2004), available at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36%257E56%257E188 7080,00.html
(quoting lawyers for Regal Cinemas, Inc.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
442. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 582 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The DOJ said it would "work with the defendants to come up with a
reasonable approach." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
443. Regal argued that "[i]f this decision is permitted to stand, not one public facility is safe
from post-construction second-guessing or ruinous retrofitting liabilities." Christine M. Garton,
Disabled Moviegoers Fight Stadium Seating, LEGAL TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 8 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
444. See Asseo, supra note 441.
445. Id.
446. Jennifer Wirth, Renovated Theater Reopens, FLA. TODAY, available at http://ccs.flatoday.
com/fe/Events/eventsstoryA6493A.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004); see also Michael L. Campbell,
The State of Our Art, available at http://www.boxoff.comljan99story4.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2004).
447. Jill Goldsmith, Hollywood Vexed by Plex Success, VARIETY, May 17-23, 2004, at 67.
448. Id.
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costs. 449 The exhibition industry gambles $15 million to $25 million on
a single megaplex, and the "growing movement to make stadium seat-
ing more accessible ... could result in even higher initial investments
by exhibitors for new theaters. '450 There is pressure from the movie
studios to relinquish "a bigger piece of the box office pie. 4 51 In addi-
tion, the stock of the three largest theater companies in the industry
has fallen seventy to eighty percent in recent years.452 This is due to
the excitement over stadium-style theaters having reached its peak
and the saturation of competition in the marketplace. 453 Theater
chains are saying redesign efforts "will raise ticket prices and possibly
obstruct the views of patrons who [do not] have disabilities. 454 Or in
the worst case scenario, it might even "put an end to stadium theaters
completely" if renovations cannot be completed cost effectively. 455
Meanwhile, movie theaters within the Fifth Circuit are immune to
any of these potential tribulations. The Ninth Circuit's decision has
led to a circuit split, which has thrown stadium seating into "chaos. ' '456
The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Lara that movie theaters need only pro-
vide unobstructed views has been challenged by the Ninth Circuit, and
many other courts across the country have since deferred to the DOJ's
interpretation of section 4.33.3.457 In addition to the jurisdictional is-
sues the Ninth Circuit's decision raises,458 there is now an absence of
uniform federal regulation on the subject. Furthermore, more theater
companies may decide to focus future construction efforts outside the
reach of the Ninth, Sixth, or First Circuits. The Oregon Paralyzed Vet-
erans of America case has "great practical importance as companies
contemplating building or operating theaters in states not covered by
one of these courts, and design professionals advising them, must con-
sider whether they want to risk litigation by building a theater that
449. Melanie Bysouth, Cost of ickets on the Rise, But You Get What You Pay For, DAILY
TITAN INTERACTIVE, available at http://dailytitan.fullerton.edu/issues/spring-O1/03-16/opinion/
0316 bysouth.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
450. Campbell, supra note 446. This is up from the three to five million dollars the industry
used to spend. Id.
451. Id. However, exhibitors are beginning to gain a better negotiating position due to rock-
eting film costs and the studios' shouldering of most of the risk. See Goldsmith, supra note 447,
at 1.
452. Warren Gump, Stadium Theaters = Massive Losses, THE MOTLEY FOOL (July 13, 2000),
at http://www.fool.com/Server/FoolPrint.asp?File=/news/foth/2000/fothOOO713.htm.
453. Id.
454. Susan M. LoTempio, Seating Takes Fun Out of Going to Movie, iCAN (Mar. 12, 2001), at
http://www.icanonline.net/news/fullpage.cfm/articleid/88F857BF-27D2-4150-8472D0B057500.
455. Id.
456. Thiruvengadam, supra note 270, at 6D.
457. See supra notes 138-194 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 289-290 and accompanying text.
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does not provide wheelchair users" with comparable viewing
angles. 459
Because of this circuit split, the issue of whether section 4.33.3 im-
poses a viewing angle requirement on movie theaters seemed likely to
move to the Supreme Court,460 even though in earlier district court
cases on this same issue, the Supreme Court denied petitions for certi-
orari.461 On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court held a private confer-
ence to consider whether to grant review to Regal Cinemas. 462 Four
days later, at the urging of the George W. Bush administration, the
Supreme Court denied review and refused to consider whether dis-
abled moviegoers must be given better seats.463 One of the factors
leading to this denial may have been Solicitor General Theodore Ol-
son's comments to the Justices that plans are in effect to revise the
government guidelines, clear up confusion, and ensure that theater de-
signs provide wheelchair patrons with seating away from the side-
lines.464  Settlement seems much more likely now that Regal
exhausted its avenues to appeal. 465 Kathleen L. Wilde, attorney for
the Oregon Advocacy Center, has said that they are "open to a settle-
ment," and theater owners also appear willing to find a common
ground since they face "hundreds of millions of dollars" in costs if a
compromise is not reached.
466
B. Assessment of Various Proposed Solutions
This section presents a summary of various proposed solutions to
the viewing angle issue in stadium-style theaters: (1) place wheelchair
seats in the far back of the stadium section of the theater; (2) place
wheelchair seats in the center of the stadium section; (3) place wheel-
chair seats at the ends of stadium section rows with access via a ramp
459. Lawrence B. Hagel, Court Rules on Stadium-Style Movie Theaters, PARAPLEGIA NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2003, at 53.
460. See Watson, supra note 6, at 1. Greg Hurley, attorney for NATO, had speculated that
there was a "good chance" that the case would wind up before the Supreme Court because of
the circuit split. Id.
461. Stadium-Style Movie Theaters That Have Wheelchair Seating Only Front Rows Violate
Americans with Disabilities Act, Federal District Court in California Rules in Case Filed by Justice
Department Against AMC, ENT. L. REP. 17, Apr. 2003.
462. Garton, supra note 443, at 8.
463. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on Monday, June 28, 2004. Or. Paralyzed Veterans
of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2903 (2004).
464. Cobbs, supra note 430.
465. Nicole Sperling, Justices Refuse Access Case: No More Appeals for Theater Owners, THE
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, June 29-July 5, 2004, at 3 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Cobbs, supra note 430.
466. Cobbs, supra note 430 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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instead of stairs; and (4) remove the traditional section altogether and
split the theater intotwo separate stadium .sections.
1. Placing Wheelchair Seats in the Far Back of the Theater's
Stadium Section
To satisfy the requirements endorsed by the Ninth Circuit, one pro-
posed solution is to place wheelchair seating in the far back of the
theater's stadium section. However, for movie theater owners, place-
ment of wheelchair seating in the back row of an auditorium could
potentially cause a number of other problems. Giving wheelchair pa-
trons access to that last row is problematic. Access is currently
achieved through the use of elevators.467 But elevators are normally
only used in theaters with capacities of three hundred or more.468 For
those smaller theaters with capacities of less than three hundred, ele-
vators would have to be installed, as they are not likely to be currently
incorporated into the theater layout and design. This leads to consid-
erable expense and impracticality. Since there are about ten thousand
individual theaters with stadium seating, "[ilt would cost $100,000 to
install elevators in each of those or $50,000 each for wheelchair
lifts.",469
Existing theaters may find it impractical to provide elevator access
to each of its auditoriums. This is especially problematic for theaters
with a particularly large number of screens.470 Sixteen-screen thea-
ters, for example, would theoretically have to provide sixteen eleva-
tors in the building. Existing theater buildings are probably not
equipped or properly designed to handle such a substantial number of
elevators in their current structures.471 To accommodate such eleva-
tor access, existing theaters will likely have to undergo demolition and
complete reconstruction. 472 While new theaters will not face the
467. In Cinemark USA, Cinemark argued that it would be a "major and expensive effort" to
rework its seating areas, built on concrete, because a ramp or elevator would be needed to reach
the elevated level. Ominsky, supra note 286, at 8-9.
468. For example, in Cinemark's theaters that seated 300 or more, the wheelchair locations in
the rear were accessed by elevator. United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 572 (6th
Cir. 2003).
469. Associated Press, Supreme Court Refuses Movie-Seating Case (June 28, 2004), available at
http://listserv.uic.edu/htbin/wa?A2=ind4O6&L=greatlakes&T=&H=1&O=D&F=&S=&P=4986
(last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
470. According to NATO, most theaters with stadium seating are large multiplexes. Id.
471. In its appeal, Regal Cinemas argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision would impose dev-
astating costs on the companies whose thousands of stadium-style theaters were built with stair
access in mind. Asseo, supra note 441. The fact that these theaters' seats can only be reached by
climbing stairs indicates that they are not elevator equipped, and the costs involved suggest the
theaters are not properly designed to incorporate elevators either.
472. See supra notes 420-421 and accompanying text.
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problems associated with reconstruction, creating a design that incor-
porates a substantial number of elevators may prove to be structurally
and financially impossible. 473 Furthermore, there are the added, con-
tinuing expenses associated with maintaining the working use of the
elevators. No movie theater would likely stay in business, as it is
doubtful that the amount earned from every concession sale could ad-
equately cover such costs.
474
2. Placing Wheelchair Seats in the Center of the Stadium Section
A second proposed solution is to provide wheelchair seating in the
direct center of the stadium section. This solution almost guarantees a
ringing endorsement from wheelchair patrons and most certainly sat-
isfies the Ninth Circuit's validation of the DOJ's interpretation of sec-
tion 4.33.3.475 Seats in the center of the stadium section are, in all
likelihood, considered the best seats in the house.
476
There are several complications that arise from affording wheel-
chair patrons these "best seats in the house." Reserving such a prime
patch of seats only for wheelchair access would monopolize a sizeable
area of stadium room, substantially decreasing the seating capacity in
stadium-style theaters.477
More importantly, wheelchair seating in the center of the theater
could constitute a substantial threat to the health and safety of every
patron in the theater, including those in wheelchairs. ADA compli-
ance is "no longer obligatory" in the event of a "direct threat" to the
health and safety of others.478 Wheelchair seating in the center of the
473. See Associated Press, supra note 469.
474. Theater exhibitors only take roughly fifty percent of a film's box office take. See Carl
DiOrio, B.O. Doesn't Tell 'Samurai' Tale, VARIETY, Jan. 19-25, 2004, at 6.
475. Steven Fellman, attorney for NATO, stated that "any place in the middle third is pretty
good." Cobbs, supra note 430 (interal quotation marks omitted).
476. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
477. One possible solution to this reduction in stadium seating for the non-disabled would be
to create conventional seats that can also be folded up and put away to make room for wheel-
chairs when necessary. This same technology, used in Baltimore's baseball stadium, can theoret-
ically be used effectively in movie theaters. See Carlson, supra note 44 at, 913-14 n.106
(discussing Robert P. Bennett, ADA Goes to the Movies, PARAPLEGIA NEws, Apr. 1994, at 53).
Section 4.33.3 allows for "[r]eadily removable seats." 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
However, this option largely pertains to sports arenas and the placement of such removable seats
in already existing wheelchair spaces. Putting removable seats in stadium-style movie theaters'
existing wheelchair spaces (which are located in the traditional section or along the access aisle)
would not solve the viewing angle problem. Furthermore, were the concept applied to seats in
the stadium section, the safety issues remain the same, regardless of whether the conventional
seats can be folded out of the way.
478. Fielder v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(3) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a)). Direct threats are defined as "significant risk[s] to
the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices,
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stadium section could prove hazardous in the event of a fire, bomb
threat, or other emergency. Both the wheelchair patron and the
others surrounding him or her could find their safety threatened in
trying to maneuver around other seats and the wheelchair itself in try-
ing to exit the theater. 479 Thus, for safety reasons,480 wheelchair seat-
ing in the center of the stadium section does not prove to be an
entirely desirable option either.
3. Placing Wheelchair Seats at the Ends of Stadium Section Rows
A third proposed solution is to place wheelchair seats on the ends
of stadium section rows, and provide access to those seats through the
use of a ramp rather than stairs. It has been suggested that the Ninth
Circuit's decision may require theaters "to install wheelchair ramps to
[the] upper-level stadium sections."' 48' Again, this solution will likely
comport with the DOJ's interpretation of section 4.33.3 and prove
popular with wheelchair patrons. Although seats at the end of the
stadium rows on the aisle are not quite the "best seats in the house,"
they nevertheless provide the desired viewing angles. 48 2
The most logical way to provide wheelchair access to seats in the
stadium section of a theater, whether at the end or the center of the
row, is to remove some of the stairways and install ramps.483 The
ADAAG provides strict guidance on ramp implementation in public
accommodations. Ramps should have the least slope possible, and the
maximum slope ratio of any ramp's rise to run in new construction is
1:12.484 A 1:12 ratio results in an approximate grade of 8.33 per-
cent.485 The maximum rise for any run is thirty inches.486 In Oregon
or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3); 28 CFR § 36.208(b)).
479. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found persuasive the argu-
ment that "the presence of a wheelchair and its occupant in the midst of able-bodied patrons in
fear for their own safety could impede a mass exodus of the theater" when an emergency arises.
Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 39.
480. Whether wheelchairs pose significant risks to other moviegoers calls for an "individual-
ized assessment" of the wheelchair patron's physical limitations and location in the theater. Id.
at 40. (internal quotation marks omitted).
481. Egelko, supra note 426.
482. Even though on the end, these seats are still in the stadium section, which DOJ counsel
said "dramatically improve[s] the experiences for people in wheelchairs." United States v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569. 583 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
483. Because many nondisabled patrons may find it easier to walk on stairs, "[r]amps should
be employed in addition to (rather than in place of) stairs." Ramps and Accessible Thresholds
(May 1997), available at http://www.abledata.com/text2/ramps.htm. [hereinafter Ramps].
484. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, §§ 4.8.1-4.8.2 (2000).
485. United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (granting
a motion of summary judgment for the government based on a report that the ramps in question
exceeded 8.33 percent, and thus violated the ADAAG).
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Paralyzed Veterans of America, each row in the stadium section was
raised fifteen to eighteen inches "above the one in front of it."'487 It is
not clear from the facts of the case whether this fifteen to eighteen
inch raise complies with the thirty-inch maximum rise for any run re-
quirement or results in a slope grade of 8.33 percent or less. The court
did not address these concerns.
In addition to having to meet the ADAAG requirements, ramps
may pose their own safety issues and considerations.4 8 8 A ramp may
adequately serve a wheelchair patron, but may pose significant
problems for non-disabled patrons. For example, if the ramp in a sta-
dium section is too steep, it could prove dangerous for elderly patrons,
whose balance and coordination may not be of the requisite level
needed to safely traverse the ramp.
489
Also, one should take into account the inevitable spilling of bever-
ages and other substances that occurs during a movie. 490 Moviegoers
may be prone to slip and fall on the ramps under such conditions in
their attempt to rush and use the bathroom during the movie, or sim-
ply while exiting at the conclusion of the film. Carpeting of the ramp
could avoid the danger of spilling, but some types of carpeting present
ease of wheelchair use problems.
49 1
4. Eliminating the Traditional Section and Splitting the Theater into
Two Stadium Sections
Perhaps the best solution to incorporating the viewing angle re-
quirement is to eliminate the traditional section altogether and split
the theater into two different stadium sections, one upper and one
lower.492 Some newly constructed theaters have already incorporated
486. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, §§ 4.8.1-4.8.2 (2000).
487. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1127.
488. Improperly designed ramps can present safety hazards, including "too steep an incline,
an uneven platform which may cause tipping of a wheelchair, unsupported plans which may
buckle under a user's weight, and unanchored planks, platforms or tracks which may 'fall off' the
step." Ramps, supra note 483.
489. For safety reasons, theaters want to use ramps in addition to stairs, not instead of them.
490. Properly installed ramps are "stable, firm and slip-resistant." Ramps, supra note 483
(internal quotation marks omitted).
491. Carpeting is covered under ADAAG regulation 4.5.3., which covers "the pile thicknesses
allowed and fastening considerations." Id. Carpeting surfaces make wheelchair operation more
difficult because, in some cases, they require "more energy output for manual wheelchair users
and greater stress on the batteries and machinery of power wheelchairs or scooters." Id.
492. Kathleen L. Wilde, legal director of the Oregon Advocacy Center, has said that "a newer,
better design puts the entrance in the middle of the theater." Green, supra note 425. Splitting
the stadium sections in two accomplishes this goal.
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this design.493 Those that have will probably avoid compliance
problems.494 These types of theaters continue to place wheelchair
seating in the access aisle; however, the main difference when the sta-
dium section is split into two parts is that the access aisle is more level
with the center of the screen, thereby affording smaller vertical view-
ing angles. 495 Both the upper and lower stadium sections are accessed
via stairs.
This solution has only two real disadvantages. One is that the pa-
trons in the very front rows of the lower stadium section still have very
sharp viewing angles, similar to, if not exactly like those in a tradi-
tional section. However, this does not negatively affect wheelchair
patrons because wheelchair seating is located in the access aisle, be-
tween the lower and upper stadium sections. The effect on other non-
disabled patrons is not as severe either because there are still plenty of
seats available in the upper stadium section. 496 The second disadvan-
tage is that this solution is only really feasible in newly constructed
theaters. Existing theaters will have to undergo major renovations
and reconstructions at considerable expense if they want to take ad-
vantage of this option.
On the other hand, the advantages to splitting the stadium section
into two parts are numerous. 497 First, wheelchair patrons are afforded
viewing angles that are comparable, in every sense of the word, to
those of the general public. Second, the notion of a "wheelchair
ghetto" is far removed because wheelchair patrons are made a more
integral part of the viewing audience, considering that they are sand-
wiched between two stadium sections.498 The effect is to feel as if one
is actually in a stadium seat.499 Third, the problems associated with
493. The newly constructed AMC River East 21 Theaters in downtown Chicago have this
design in several of the larger theaters.
494. Cobbs, supra note 430.
495. In theaters with both a traditional section and a stadium section, the access aisle is lo-
cated on a sloped floor and behind the traditional section. Patrons in either the traditional sec-
tion or access aisle have to look up to the screen instead of directly in front of them, thus
creating much higher viewing angles.
496. These patrons may have to plan in advance to get to the theater early because otherwise
they will not have access to the upper stadium section seats.
497. At an IMAX theater in Houston, Texas, Julia Hollenbeck, a wheelchair patron, had this
to say about the arrangement, "You have the best seat in the house. It's fantastic. You don't
have anyone staring at you. It's comfortable, it's pleasant, you can swing in and out easily ... If
the other theaters would do it, I'd go all the time." Nicole Bondi, Wheelchair Users Criticize
Theater Seating, iCAN (Mar. 8, 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://
www.icanonline.net/news/fulipage.cfm?articleid=6A9F5B3C-19C3-44B4-9OE6AEB1995AFF59.
498. See supra note 44.
499. See Comment, supra note 69, at 729 (arguing that future courts could avoid administra-
tive rulemaking by adopting the DOJ's interpretation of the integration requirement found in
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ramps, or the dangers that may result from the placement of wheel-
chairs in the middle of the theater in an emergency are nonexistent.
Finally, while satisfying the viewing angle requirement, this solution
also satisfies the access and emergency exit, integral part of a fixed
seating plan, and adjacency to companion seating requirements. 500
Thus, the best proposed solution to the problem of complying with the
Ninth Circuit's decision, if only applied prospectively and not retroac-
tively, is for newly constructed movie theaters now and in the future
to get rid of the traditional section in their designs and split the sta-
dium section in half.
C. Proposed Resolution: Apply the Ninth Circuit Decision
Prospectively and Amend Section 4.33.3 or Adopt a New
Rule before Imposing a Viewing Angle
Requirement on Existing Theaters
In his dissent, Judge Kleinfeld said: "Regulating movie theater ar-
chitecture . . . by vague judicial fiat is unjust."' 50 1 The Ninth Circuit
threatens to instigate such an injustice by deferring to the DOJ's inter-
pretation of section 4.33.3 and applying it retroactively. In publishing
final regulations that implement Title III of the ADA, the DOJ incor-
porated the Access Board's ADAAG without change. 502 While Con-
gress may have charged the DOJ with enforcing Title III and
promulgating regulations, the DOJ was also required to adopt regula-
tions that meet the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by
the Access Board.50 3 Thus, because the Access Board has already
amended its own guidelines, the DOJ should follow suit and formally
amend its regulation to meet these new requirements.
Section 4.33.3 incorporates ambiguous language that has been sub-
ject to substantial amounts of litigation. 50 4 District courts are split,
circuits are split, the Supreme Court refuses to get involved, and the
section 4.33.3 instead of the sightlines requirement). Integration of stadium seating "affirm[s]
the civil rights model of integration on which the ADA is based." Id. at 731. Basing a ruling on
the integration requirement instead of the sightlines requirement would arguably prove benefi-
cial because: (1) "the integration [requirement] is not burdened by the administrative history
concerns of the sightlines dispute;" and (2) "the integration requirement obviates the need for
courts to draft technical, hyperspecific seating rules." Id. at 731-32. Furthermore, a ruling based
on integration would better accomplish the intent of Congress: to "advanc[e] the debate over
disability discrimination from a physical, medical one to" one focused on segregation and its
social consequences. Id. at 734.
500. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2003).
501. Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d at 1134 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
502. 28 C.F.R. § 36.406 (2003).
503. See 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (2000).
504. See cases cited supra note 9.
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Access Board and the DOJ are in disagreement over whether wheel-
chair locations are always required in stadium sections.50 5 Instead of
continually bringing lawsuits against movie theater chains over an is-
sue that has been around for nine years,50 6 the DOJ and Access Board
should work together to revise the regulations and make them clearer.
Six years have passed since the DOJ put its current interpretation of
section 4.33.3 into effect, 50 7 and "[i]t is unsettling that the government
has not talked with the industry to set standards for this." 50 8 In pro-
moting its interpretation, the DOJ's initiation of "a calculated litiga-
tion campaign in lieu of rulemaking" constitutes an abuse of its
authority.50 9 The proper course is to adopt "a formal amendment-
almost certainly prospective and after notice and comment. '510 De-
spite the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, the outlook is some-
what bright: Solicitor General Theodore Olson said that the
government guidelines "will soon be revised" and "will clear up con-
fusion. '511 Indeed, the DOJ has announced such plans for January
2005, including adoption of the Access Board's amended
guidelines. 512
As the Ninth Circuit decision currently stands, it should only apply
on a prospective basis due to the high costs of renovation and the
confusion surrounding adequate compliance. 513 The soon-to-be-re-
vised Title III regulations should require that all theaters provide
wheelchair patrons with viewing angles comparable to those in the
stadium section and, at the same time, supply a theater floor plan de-
tailing the exact method of compliance. The separation of theaters
into both a "stadium" section and a "traditional" section needs to be
eliminated. Wheelchair patrons and movie theater owners deserve
nothing less.
505. See United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 565 (lst Cir. 2004) (citing 69
Fed. Reg. at 44,198).
506. See Hoyts Cinemas, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 92-93.
507. Id. at 92 (emphasis omitted).
508. Thiruvengadam, supra note 270 (quoting Steven Fellman, attorney for NATO) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
509. Ellsworth, supra note 319, at 1139.
510. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 569.
511. Associated Press, supra note 469.
512. Hoyts Cinemas, 380 F.3d at 565 n.6 (citing Unified Agenda, 69 Fed. Reg. 37,734, 37,749
(June 28, 2004)).
513. The industry cannot afford to rebuild the 18.000 theaters that the Ninth Circuit's decision
affects as it could cost "hundreds of millions of dollars." Cobbs, supra note 430.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Section 4.33.3 has resulted in substantial litigation over the years
because it is an ambiguous regulation in light of the development of
stadium seating in movie theaters. 51 4 Both the DOJ and the Ninth
Circuit believe that the phrase "lines of sight comparable" now en-
compasses viewing angles, something it did not at the time of promul-
gation.515  The Fifth Circuit disagrees, 516  the Access Board's
amendments to the ADAAG have yet to be adopted, 517 and the Su-
preme Court has refused to consider the issue. 518 Wheelchair patrons
are certainly entitled to the "full and equal enjoyment" 519 of the ad-
vantages of stadium seating, but architects and movie theater owners
should not be "penalized" for having complied with the regulations as
they were interpreted at the time of construction of their stadium-
style theaters.520 The costs associated with retrofitting are too high to
proceed without clear and specific guidance.521 Instead of continuing
to support an interpretation of an ambiguous phrase, and attempting
to engage in retroactive regulation, the DOJ should refrain from fu-
ture litigation and involve the Access Board in either revising section
4.33.3 or adopting a new regulation. 522 The Ninth Circuit decision
should only be applied prospectively, and existing theaters should be
relieved of any viewing angle requirements until the regulation is
revised.
John Hammerle *
514. See supra notes 292-326 and accompanying text.
515. See, e.g., Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 339 F.3d 1126. See supra notes 252-258 and
accompanying text.
516. See, e.g., Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2000). See supra notes
125-137 and accompanying text.
517. See, e.g., United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 565 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing
69 Fed. Reg. at 44,198). See supra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
518. See, e.g., Associated Press, supra note 469.
519. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA provides individuals full and equal enjoyment of
public accommodations, and section 302(b) states: goods, services, and facilities must "be af-
forded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
the individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)-(b)(1)(B) (2000).
520. See supra notes 401-421 and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Cinemark
USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 576, 581 (6th Cir. 2003).
521. See supra notes 437-455 and accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 501-513 and accompanying text.
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